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Abstract
This paper relies on a Ramsey model with money to o¤er a simple theory of
secular stagnation. The permanent failure of the economy to produce at full ca-
pacity results from three features: (i) The combination of the zero lower bound on
the nominal interest rate and of an ination ceiling imposes a lower bound on the
real interest rate; (ii) Some dynastic households have a high propensity to save, due
to a preference for wealth; (iii) A downward wage rigidity breaks the deationary
spiral resulting from the lack of demand. In this framework, I derive the paradox
of exibility, of thrift, and of toil.
If the ination ceiling cannot be raised, then the government needs to rely on
scal policy to escape secular stagnation. However, a conventional scal stimulus
is not an e¢ cient response to a permanent liquidity trap, and can even be welfare
reducing. The solution is instead to tax household wealth and to subsidize income
from physical capital, through an investment subsidy or a reduction in the taxation
of corporate income. This optimal policy is revenue neutral and implements the
rst-best allocation of resources. However, to avoid a jump in the price level upon
implementation of the optimal policy, the government needs to redeem the money
that had previously been supplied to nance public decits.
Keywords: Liquidity trap, Monetary and scal policy, Secular stagnation
JEL Classication: E12, E31, E62, E63
1 Introduction
Keynes (1936) explained how an economy can be depressed due to a lack of demand.
Indeed, if householdsdemand for consumption and rmsdemand for investment are
excessively low, then the economy fails to produce at full capacity. While the resulting
Contact: Jean-Baptiste.Michau@polytechnique.edu
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depressions are usually seen as an extreme manifestation of a business cycle phenomenon,
Hansen (1939) was the rst to worry that it might be a permanent state of a¤airs. This
is the "secular stagnation" hypothesis.
When aggregate demand is weak, ination declines and the central bank responds by
aggressively cutting the nominal interest rate such as to stimulate demand. However,
a fundamental constraint on monetary policy is that the nominal interest rate cannot
be negative. Indeed, no-one is willing to pay more than $100 for a bond yielding $100
in the future. In the mid-1990s, Japan was the rst large industrialized country to hit
the zero lower bound and to fall into the liquidity trap. Its subsequent history, with
an economy mired in very low ination and weak GDP growth, suggests that there is
no mechanism through which an economy naturally recovers from a persistent lack of
demand. Moreover, Japan is facing a policy conundrum as aggregate demand remains
desperately weak despite a budget decit of about 7% of GDP, a debt-to-GDP ratio of
230%, and substantial monetary accommodation.
Over the past few years, there has been growing concerns that the U.S. and the Eu-
rozone might be in a similar situation as Japan. In particular, Summers (2014) has
emphasized that the credit boom of 2003-2007 in the U.S. did not generate a correspond-
ing economic boom, which suggests that the unsustainable demand for consumption of
poor borrowers was hiding an already weak level of demand of rich lenders.
Despite the prominence of the secular stagnation hypothesis in the policy debate,
there has been few attempts to model it explicitly. In this paper, I o¤er a simple theory
of secular stagnation, on which I then rely for a careful policy analysis. The structure
of the model is a Ramsey economy with money and exible prices, to which I add three
features.
First, I assume that the central bank imposes a ceiling on ination. This, together
with the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate, generates a lower bound on the
real interest rate. In most industrialized countries, central banks never allow ination to
exceed 2%, which prevents the real interest rate from ever falling below -2%.
Second, I assume that households derive utility from holding wealth. This can raise
their propensity to save to such an extent that a negative real interest rate is necessary
for the economy to produce at full capacity. Importantly, innitely lived households
should be interpreted as dynasties. Hence, bequest motives are important determinants
of the saving behavior of households. In particular, we know that pure altruism alone
cannot account for the observed patterns of bequests (Kopczuk 2009). Instead, parents
seem to be commonly motivated by the "joy of giving". A "capitalist spirit" also induces
many individuals to derive intrinsic utility from the accumulation of wealth, which is then
passed on from generation to generation (Carroll 2000, Kopczuk 2007).1 While I rely for
1Also, Piketty (2011) relies on a model with wealth in the utility to show that the inheritance-to-
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simplicity on a representative household model, my results only require that a strictly
positive mass of households has a preference for wealth. Indeed, a well known result in
macroeconomics is that the real interest must eventually be determined by the behavior
of the most patient households. This is highly relevant as the rise in inequality is often
cited as a major cause of the recent decline in aggregate demand (Summers 2014). A
preference for wealth seems a natural explanation for the concentration of wealth in the
hands of a small number of households with a very low propensity to spend (Kumhof,
Rancière and Winant 2015).
Finally, I impose a downward wage rigidity. If the ination ceiling is su¢ ciently
low and the preference for wealth su¢ ciently strong, then aggregate demand is smaller
than aggregate supply. This reduces ination, which raises the real interest rate, which
further contracts aggregate demand. To have a stationary secular stagnation equilibrium,
I therefore need to put a break on the deationary spiral. This is achieved through the
downward wage rigidity.
In the secular stagnation equilibrium, aggregate demand is depressed. This induces
rmslabor demand to fall short of workerslabor supply. However, this ine¢ ciency is
primarily due to the lower bound on the real interest rate, not to the downward wage
rigidity. Indeed, if wages are more exible, then ination is smaller, the real interest
is higher, and the economy is even more depressed. Conversely, for a su¢ ciently high
ination ceiling, there always exists a frictionless steady state equilibrium where the
economy produces at full capacity.2
The obvious policy response to secular stagnation is to raise the ination ceiling.
However, in most countries, this seems politically and institutionally out of reach. Hence,
I explore alternative remedies. A simple policy analysis conrms that the usual set of
tools used for macroeconomic stabilization are not adequate in the context of secular
stagnation. Increasing the money supply through open market operations is useless in a
liquidity trap. A helicopter drop of money that is su¢ ciently large to induce the economy
to produce at full capacity is inconsistent with the ination ceiling. A scal stimulus raises
rmsdemand for labor much more than workersconsumption level. Hence, it is likely
to be welfare reducing, even though the government spending multiplier is typically well
above 1.
However, with a wider set of policy instruments, the government can implement the
rst-best allocation of resources without raising the ination ceiling. To understand
this result, note that secular stagnation is fundamentally due to an excessively high real
income ratio is a rising function of r  g, consistently with the historical experience of France from 1820
to 2009.
2Interestingly, in the secular stagnation equilibrium, ination is essentially determined by the down-
ward wage rigidity. Hence, the real interest rate is typically well above its lower bound, which results in
a very depressed level of aggregate demand.
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interest rate. This creates two distortions. First, it raises the cost of capital. This
reduces the demand for investment, resulting in depressed capital-labor ratio. Second, a
high real interest rate reduces the demand for consumption. The rst distortion should
be addressed by subsidizing the income from physical capital. This can either be achieved
through an investment subsidy or a reduction in the taxation of corporate income. The
second distortion can be o¤set through a wealth tax, which reduces the e¤ective real
interest rate faced by consumers. This policy is revenue neutral and it exactly replicates
the allocation of resources that would result from an increase in the ination ceiling.
By inducing the economy to produce at full capacity, the optimal policy makes the
price level proportional to the money supply. Hence, to prevent a jump in the price level
upon implementation of the policy, the government must redeem the money supply that
is not used for transactions. This suggests that relying on the printing press to nance
some stimulus can eventually make the government reluctant to implement the optimal
policy.
Related Literature. Secular stagnation is a stationary phenomenon. However, in
typical models of the liquidity trap, the binding zero lower bound forces the real interest
rate to be above householdsdiscount rate (Krugman 1998, Eggertsson and Woodford
2003, Werning 2012). This induces households to adopt a rising path of consumption,
which is inconsistent with stationarity. A model of secular stagnation must therefore
reconcile an excessively high real interest rate, which depresses aggregate demand, with
the existence of a stationary equilibrium.
Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014) solved the problem by relying on an overlapping
generation model without altruistic links. In their theory of secular stagnation, aggregate
demand is either depressed because of a low rate of population growth or because the
economy has been hit by a deleveraging shock.3 Interestingly, to eliminate the output
gap, the government can either increase its spending or redistribute income from lenders
to borrowers.
Kocherlakota (2013) showed that, with overlapping generations or credit constraints,
secular stagnation can result from a fall in the price of land. Caballero and Farhi (2015)
relied on a perpetual youth model with risky assets to o¤er an alternative theory of secular
stagnation where the lack of demand is due to a shortage of safe assets. To escape the
depression, the government should either allow ination to increase or raise the supply
of public debt, possibly by buying private risky assets.
My contribution to this literature is to show that secular stagnation can be derived in
a Ramsey economy where some households have a preference for wealth. Under a dynastic
interpretation of innitely lived households, my work shows that altruistic links across
3They also considered the possibility that demand is depressed due to a rise in inequality, where
agents with low propensity to consume become wealthier, or to a fall in the price of investment goods.
4
generations are not inconsistent with the existence of a stationary secular stagnation
equilibrium. On the contrary, the bequest motive seems to be a natural justication for
the preference for wealth that delivers stationarity. The Ramsey framework is convenient
for policy analysis. This allows me to characterize the optimal policy that implements the
rst-best allocation of resources without raising the ination ceiling. Also, by introducing
money into the economy, I can investigate the monetary nancing of public decits.
In a related contribution, Michaillat and Saez (2015) o¤er a model of the business cycle
where self-employed households exchange their labor services under matching frictions.
As prices and market tightness are not independently determined, they focus on an
equilibrium where ination is constant and where market tightness adjusts such as to
equate aggregate demand to aggregate supply. Hence, business cycle uctuations result in
ine¢ cient uctuations in market tightness. To have a permanent liquidity trap, they also
assume that households have a preference for wealth. Interestingly, as a lack of demand
does not translate into lower ination, they do not obtain the Keynesian paradoxes.
Another strand of the literature has emphasized the role of expectations. Benhabib,
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001) showed that, if the central bank follows a Taylor rule,
then self-fullling expectations can induce the economy to fall into a permanent liquidity
trap. Benigno and Fornaro (2015) proposed a theory of "stagnation traps" where the
weakness of aggregate demand depresses investment in innovation, resulting in a low rate
of technological progress. This pushes the nominal interest rate against the zero lower
bound, which explains why aggregate demand remains so weak. In that context, subsidies
to investment in innovation are welfare enhancing.
The optimal policy that I derive is similar to the "unconventional scal policy" of
Correia, Farhi, Nicolini and Teles (2013). They showed that, in a new Keynesian model,
it is possible to replicate a negative nominal interest rate by implementing a rising path of
consumption taxes, to induce agents to front-load their demand for consumption, together
with a falling path of labor income taxes, to o¤set the resulting distortion to labor
supply. In the presence of capital, this policy must be supplemented with a temporary
capital subsidy. However, they only considered a temporary liquidity trap. By contrast,
under secular stagnation, the economy is permanently liquidity trapped. I therefore
restrict my attention to stationary policies. Eggertsson (2010) also showed that some
scal instruments can be relied upon to stimulate aggregate demand.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the representative household
model of secular stagnation. In Section 3, I discuss some important properties of the
secular stagnation equilibrium. In Section 4, I investigate the e¤ectiveness of conventional
macroeconomic stabilization policies. The optimal policy is derived in Section 5. The
implications of heterogeneity are briey discussed in Section 6. The paper ends with a
conclusion.
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2 The Representative Household Model
2.1 Households
Time is continuous. There is a mass 1 of innitely lived households. Each household
consumes a quantity ct of a single consumption good with price Pt. It supplies labor lt
paid at nominal wage Wt and receives a real lump-sum transfer  t. The nominal wealth
At of a household is composed of physical capital Kt, government bonds Bt, and money
Mt:
At = P
K
t Kt +Bt +Mt; (1)
where PKt denotes the nominal price of capital. Firms pay Rt to rent capital from
households. Capital depreciates at rate . There are three components to the nominal
return from a unit of physical capital: the rent Rt, the loss due to depreciation PKt , and
the capital gain _PKt . Bonds yield a nominal return it, while money yields a zero nominal
return. The wealth of the representative household therefore evolves according to:
_At =
h
Rt   PKt + _PKt
i
Kt + itBt +Wtlt + Pt t   Ptct;
= itAt +
"
Rt
PKt
   +
_PKt
PKt
  it
#
PKt Kt   itMt +Wtlt + Pt t   Ptct: (2)
Let t = _Pt=Pt denote the rate of ination, rt = it t the real interest rate, wt = Wt=Pt
the real wage, at = At=Pt the real household wealth,mt =Mt=Pt the real money holdings,
and pKt = P
K
t =Pt the real price of capital, measured in units of consumption good.
Dividing the wealth accumulation equation by the price level Pt, while using the fact
that _At=Pt = _at + tat and _PKt =P
K
t = _p
K
t =p
K
t + t, yields:
_at = rtat +

Rt
PKt
   + _p
K
t
pKt
  rt

pKt Kt   itmt + wtlt +  t   ct: (3)
In the absence of uncertainty, by arbitrage, the returns from holding capital must be
equal to the returns from holding bonds. Thus, the second term on the right hand side of
(3) must be equal to zero, which yields the following relationship between the user cost
of capital and the real interest rate:
rt =
Rt
PKt
   + _p
K
t
pKt
: (4)
The wealth accumulation equation therefore simplies to:
_at = rtat   itmt + wtlt +  t   ct: (5)
6
The intertemporal budget constraint prevents households from running Ponzi schemes:
lim
t!1
e 
R t
0 rsdsat  0: (6)
The representative household discounts the future at rate  > 0. At any point in time,
it derives utility u (ct) from consuming ct, with u0 () > 0, u00 () < 0, and limc!0 u0 (c) =
1. It also derives utility h (mt) from holding real money balances mt, with h0 () > 0,
h00 () < 0, limm!0 h0 (m) = 1, and h0 (m) = 0 for all m  m. At m, the household
is satiated with real money balances and does not derive any utility from holding more
money for transaction purposes. The household incurs disutility v (lt) from supplying
labor lt, with v0 () > 0, v00 () > 0, v0 (0) = 0, and liml!l v0 (l) = 1 where l is the
maximum feasible supply of labor, which can be innite. The household also derives
utility from holding wealth at. However, it knows that it will eventually need to cover the
liabilities of the government, which are composed of the real aggregate supply of public
debt bst and of money m
s
t . The utility derived by a household from holding wealth is
therefore equal to  (at   (bst +mst)), with 0 () > 0, 00 ()  0, and limK!0 0 (K) <1.
Finally, at any time t, utility is additively separable between its four components. The
intertemporal utility function is therefore given by:Z 1
0
e t [u (ct)  v (lt) + h (mt) +  (at   (bst +mst))] dt: (7)
Including the government liabilities bst + m
s
t into the utility function ensures that
the Ricardian equivalence holds and that the model has reasonable welfare properties.
Indeed, if households did derive utility from holding wealth independently of the level of
government liabilities, then the government would be able to articially increase welfare
by giving households a huge lump-sum subsidy that would eventually be o¤set by a huge
lump-sum tax. This would increase both the level of public debt bst and the wealth at
of households and, hence, their welfare. At the zero lower bound, money and bonds are
perfect substitutes and welfare could also be articially increased by raising the aggregate
money supply mst . I therefore assume that the government cannot mechanically raise
welfare by increasing the level of public liabilities. Note that, in the interesting special case
where the marginal utility of wealth is constant, the behavior of households is identical
whether or not government liabilities are included in the utility function.
The households problem is to maximize intertemporal utility, (7), subject to the
budget constraint, (5) and (6), with a0 given. Importantly, the paths of public debt bst and
of aggregate money supply mst from time 0 onwards are exogenous to the representative
households actions. By the maximum principle, the solution to the households problem
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is characterized by:
_ct
ct
=

rt   + 
0 (at   (bst +mst))
u0 (ct)

u0 (ct)
 u00 (ct) ct ; (8)
v0 (lt) = wtu0 (ct) ; (9)
h0 (mt) = itu0 (ct) ; (10)
together with the transversality condition:
lim
t!1
e tu0 (ct) at = 0: (11)
When it = 0, there is no opportunity cost of holding money rather than bonds. In
that case, the households utility from real money balances must be satiated. Moreover,
when it = 0, money and bonds are both zero interest yielding assets that can be used
for saving, i.e. they are perfect substitutes. The household is therefore happy to rely on
money for saving and, hence, its demand for real money balances can be anything greater
or equal to m. The zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate it therefore follows
from the money demand equation (10).
2.2 Firms
Firms rent capital Kdt from households and employ labor Lt to produce output yt using
a constant returns to scale neoclassical production function:
yt = F
 
Kdt ; Lt

: (12)
They choose their demand for capital Kdt and for labor Lt such as to maximize their
prots:
PtF
 
Kdt ; Lt
 RtKdt  WtLt: (13)
In equilibrium, each factor of production must be paid its marginal product:
Rt
Pt
= FK
 
Kdt ; Lt

; (14)
wt =
Wt
Pt
= FL
 
Kdt ; Lt

: (15)
By assumption, one unit of output can either be transformed into a consumption good
or an investment good.4 Hence, if investment is strictly positive, then the price of capital
must be equal to that of consumption, i.e. pKt = P
K
t =Pt = 1. In that case, by (4) and
4However, investment goods cannot be transformed into consumption goods, i.e. investment cannot
be negative.
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(14), the real interest rate must be given by:
rt = FK
 
Kdt ; Lt
  : (16)
This expression applies in steady state where investment must be strictly positive to
compensate the depreciation of capital.
2.3 Government
Let M st and m
s
t denote the nominal and real money supply at time t, respectively. The
growth rate of the nominal money supply at t is given by t = _M
s
t =M
s
t . We therefore
have M st = M0e
R t
0 sds, where the initial money supply M0 is assumed to be exogenously
given.5 The supply of money by the government is therefore characterized by t for all
t 2 [0;+1).
At any time t, the government gets real revenue _M st =Pt from seigniorage, it incurs
real expenditures gt, and it makes a lump-sum transfer  t to each household. Thus, the
nominal supply Bst of government bonds evolves according to:
_Bst = itB
s
t + Pt t + Ptgt   _M st : (17)
Thus, using the fact that _Bst =Pt = _b
s
t + b
s
t , the real level of public debt b
s
t = B
s
t =Pt
evolves according to:
_bst = (it   t) bst +  t + gt  
_M st
M st
M st
Pt
;
= rtb
s
t +  t + gt   tmst : (18)
Note that tm
s
t = _M
s
t =Pt = _m
s
t + tm
s
t . Thus, expression (18) for the accumulation of
public debt can also be written as:
_bst + _m
s
t = rt [b
s
t +m
s
t ] +  t + gt   itmst : (19)
Integrating the debt accumulation equation (18) gives:
e 
R t
0 rxdxbst = b0 +
Z t
0
e 
R s
0 rxdx [ s + gs   smss] ds; (20)
5If the government can implement a discrete increase in the money supply at time 0, then it can
e¤ectively choose the initial price level P0 such as to dilute the initial stock B0 of government debt.
Thus, taking M0 as given in the context of monetary policy is like preventing the taxation of initial
capital in the context of scal policy.
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where b0 = B0=P0 with B0 exogenously given. Integrating instead equation (19) yields:
e 
R t
0 rxdx (bst +m
s
t) = b0 +m0 +
Z t
0
e 
R s
0 rxdx [ s + gs   ismss] ds: (21)
In this setup, we can consider two versions of the intertemporal government budget
constraint. The rst is given by the following no-Ponzi condition:
lim
t!1
e 
R t
0 rxdx (bst +m
s
t)  0: (22)
This implies that money is a liability to the government, which must therefore asymp-
totically have enough wealth to be able to redeem the outstanding money supply. This is
the most conservative version of the intertemporal budget constraint. It corresponds to
a government that behaves responsibly and that always wants to be in full control of the
money supply. Hence, seigniorage cannot be a permanent source of revenue. Indeed, as
can be seen from (21), by issuing money rather than bonds, the government only econ-
omizes on the nominal interest rate. This no-Ponzi condition (22) is the most common
form of the intertemporal government budget constraint found in the literature (see, for
instance, Kocherlakota and Phelan 1999).
The lax version of the intertemporal government budget constraint is given by:
lim
t!1
e 
R t
0 rxdxbst  0: (23)
Thus, asymptotically, the present value of debt cannot be positive. However, this does
not put any restriction on the ability of the government to print money in order to pay
down its debts. Indeed, equation (20) shows that, under the no-Ponzi condition (23),
seigniorage is a source of public revenue. This implies that a government that issues debt
in its own currency cannot be insolvent. Buiter (2014) forcefully argues that this is the
intertemporal budget constraint that governments legally face as they do not have any
obligation to redeem the outstanding money supply.
For most of my analysis, I will consider the conservative version of the government
budget constraint, given by (22). Indeed, a government with a strong commitment to
keeping ination low wants to be able to redeem its outstanding money supply under all
circumstances. Moreover, I want to characterize policies that can lift the economy out of
depression without resulting in a huge accumulation of money or public debt that would
be very dangerous should economic circumstances unexpectedly change in the future
(as would be the case if households suddenly ceased to have a preference for wealth).
I will nevertheless occasionally comment on the consequences of the lax version of the
government budget constraint.
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2.4 Market Clearing
In a frictionless equilibrium, ve market clearing conditions must be satised. In the
market for goods, production must be equal to sum of consumption, investment, and
government expenditures:
yt = ct + Kt + _Kt + gt; (24)
where investment is equal to Kt+ _Kt. In the labor market, rmslabor demand Lt must
be equal to workerslabor supply lt:
Lt = lt: (25)
The market for physical capital clears when the quantity Kt supplied by households
through their savings is equal to the quantity Kdt demanded by rms:
Kt = K
d
t : (26)
In the bond market, householdsdemand for bonds Bt must be equal to the government
supply Bst :
Bt = B
s
t : (27)
Finally, in equilibrium, the market for money must also clear. The households nominal
demand for money is equal to Ptmt, while the supply of money by the government is
equal to M st =M0e
R t
0 sds. Thus, the market for money is in equilibrium provided that:
mt = e
R t
0 (s s)dsM0=P0; (28)
where I have used the fact that Pt = P0e
R t
0 sds.
2.5 Frictions
If prices, interest rates, and wages were unconstrained, then the ve market clearing
conditions would be satised. However, to obtain a stationary secular stagnation equi-
librium, where the economy fails to produce at full capacity, I impose some restrictions
on the adjustment of interest rates and of wages.
In an economy with at currency, a fundamental constraint on the equilibrium is that
the nominal interest rate cannot be negative:
it  0: (29)
Indeed, no-one is willing to pay more than 100$ for a bond yielding 100$ in a year. People
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would rather choose to rely on money for saving. This follows from the money demand
equation (10).
Prices are perfectly exible. The central bank never allows ination to rise above a
ceiling . Thus, in equilibrium, we must have:
t  : (30)
The combination of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate and of the upper
bound on ination results in a lower bound on the real interest rate:
rt   : (31)
Note that nothing in the model justies the existence of an upper bound on ination.
However, it is a key ingredient of secular stagnation that does accurately describe the
behavior of all major central banks around the world.
If wages were perfectly exible, then they would be given by the marginal product of
labor (15) with labor demand Lt equal to labor supply lt:
wt = FL (Kt; lt) : (32)
However, a binding zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate could result in a
deationary feedback loop, whereby a lack of demand induces a fall in prices, which
raises the real interest rate, which further reduces demand. This is inconsistent with the
existence of a stationary equilibrium. Hence, to put a break on the extent of deation, I
assume that wages are downward rigid.
Recall that the real wage wt must always be equal to the marginal product of labor
FL (Kt; Lt), as otherwise rms can increase prots by adjusting employment. For xed
values of the stock of physical capital Kt and of labor demand Lt, the nominal wage
Wt = PtFL (Kt; Lt) increases by the rate of ination t. I impose the following lower
bound on wage growth for unchanged values of Kt and Lt:
(1 + tdt)Wt 
 
1 + Rdt

Wt   (dt) [Wt   PtFL (Kt; lt)] ; (33)
where R denotes the reference rate of ination used in the wage bargaining process and
  0 denotes the speed of convergence of the wage to the marginal product of labor at
full employment.
I assume thatWt  PtFL (Kt; lt) and the wage rigidity constraint (33) must hold with
complementary slackness. Thus, ifWt > PtFL (Kt; lt), then it must be due to the binding
wage rigidity constraint. Workers would like their nominal wage to increase at rate R,
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but are willing to accept a smaller increase to reduce the gap between their current wage
Wt and the marginal product of labor at full employment PtFL (Kt; lt). Conversely, if the
wage rigidity constraint is not binding, then the wage Wt must be equal to the marginal
product of labor at full employment PtFL (Kt; lt).
The lower bound on wage growth is specied for xed values of Kt and Lt, i.e. the left
hand side of the inequality is (1 + tdt)Wt = (1 + tdt)PtFL (Kt; Lt) = Pt+dtFL (Kt; Lt)
rather than Wt+dt = Pt+dtFL (Kt+dt; Lt+dt). I am therefore assuming that, in the wage
bargaining process, workers are willing to adjust their wage rate if it reects a change in
the stock of physical capital or in the amount of labor employed by rms. Thus, workers
accept a wage cut if rms employ them for more hours, which reduces the marginal
product of labor. By contrast, without this adjustment, the fall in the marginal product
of labor following an increase in Lt would need to be compensated by higher ination
for the nominal wage PtFL (Kt; Lt) to remain unchanged. This would greatly complicate
the out-of-steady-state dynamics of ination.6 Note that, in steady state, both Kt and
Lt are constant and these considerations are therefore irrelevant.
Two natural benchmarks are R = 0, which corresponds to a reluctance by workers to
accept nominal wage cuts, and R = , in which case workers would like their nominal
wage to increase by the ination ceiling, which might also be the central banks ination
target.7 Throughout my analysis, I shall consider that:
R  : (34)
Thus, workers never bargain for nominal wages that increase faster than the ination
ceiling. If  = 0, then nominal wages for given values of Kt and Lt cannot increase
by less than the reference rate of ination R, independently of the amount lt of labor
supplied; while, as !1, wages become perfectly exible.
The wage rigidity constraint (33) can be written in real terms as:

t  
 
R   wt  FL (Kt; lt) : (35)
In equilibrium, we must have t 2
 
R   ;+1 as, otherwise, the constraint cannot be
satised. The downward wage rigidity assumption is that (35) and wt  FL (Kt; lt) must
hold with complementary slackness. Thus, if the wage rigidity constraint is slack, then
wt = FL (Kt; lt), which, by (35), implies t 2
 
R;+1. Hence, if t 2  R   ; R,
then the wage rigidity constraint must hold with equality. If wt > FL (Kt; lt), then the
6If  is close to zero and R close to , then ination might have to rise above the ceiling  to
compensate for a fall in the marginal product of capital or labor. This can prevent the existence of an
equilibrium.
7Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014) impose a similar wage rigidity assumption, but assume that R = 0.
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wage rigidity constraint must be binding, which implies that t 2
 
R   ; R. Hence,
if t 2

R;+1, then wt = FL (Kt; lt). The real wage must therefore satisfy:
wt =
(
FL (Kt; lt)

t (R )FL (Kt; lt)
if t 2

R;+1
if t 2
 
R   ; R (36)
Recall that we always have wt = FL (Kt; Lt). Hence, if ination is above the reference
rate R of ination, then the downward wage rigidity is not binding and the labor market
clears, i.e. Lt = lt. If, however, ination is below the reference rate R, then the
downward wage rigidity maintains the real wage above the marginal product of labor at
full employment, which generates a labor demand Lt that falls short of the labor supply
lt. For a given rate t of ination smaller than R, a rise in wage exibility as measured
by  reduces the discrepancy between labor demand and labor supply.
2.6 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is dened as follows.
Denition 1 An equilibrium consists of paths of prices P0 and
 
rt; it; t; wt; Rt; p
K
t
1
t=0
,
of quantities
 
ct; lt; Kt; bt; yt; Lt; K
d
t ;mt
1
t=0
, and of a government policy ( t; gt; t; b
s
t)
1
t=0
such that:
 rt = it   t with it  0 and t  ;
 (ct; lt; Kt; bt;mt) solves the consumers problem given
 
rt; it; wt; Rt; p
K
t ;  t
1
t=0
, K0,
b0 = B0=P0, and m0 =M0=P0;
  yt; Lt; Kdt 1t=0 solves the producers problem given P0 and (t; wt; Rt)1t=0;
 ( t; gt; t; bst)1t=0 satises the intertemporal government budget constraint given (rt; it; t)1t=0,
b0 = B0=P0, and m0 =M0=P0;
 Equilibrium prices P0 and
 
rt; it; t; wt; Rt; p
K
t
1
t=0
are such that markets clear:
The market for goods clears: yt = ct + Kt + _Kt + gt;
The market for physical capital clears: Kt = Kdt ;
The bond market clears: bt = bst ;
The market for money clears: mt = e
R t
0 (s s)dsM0=P0;
The real wage is given by (36).8
8Clearly, the real wage being equal to both (15) and (36), the labor market does not necessarily clear
in equilibrium.
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I rst characterize the steady state equilibria of this economy. I then discuss their
stability. Throughout this section, I set the government expenditures to zero, i.e. gt = 0,
and impose the conservative version of the intertemporal government budget constraint,
given by (22). I take the growth rate t of the money supply as given and subsequently
characterize the conditions that it needs to satisfy in equilibrium. I assume that the
lump-sum transfer  t is constant over time and that it adjusts such as to have a binding
intertemporal government budget constraint given (it; rt; t)
1
t=0, b0 = B0=P0, and m0 =
M0=P0.9 The equilibrium level of government debt bt is determined by the resulting
policy, according to (20).
2.6.1 Steady State Equilibria
In a steady state equilibrium, consumption ct, labor supply lt, labor demand Lt, physical
capital Kt, the real wage wt, and the real interest rate rt must all be constant over time.
Without loss of generality, we can also consider that both ination t and the nominal
interest rate it are constant over time.10 I subsequently drop the time subscripts from
those variables to refer to their steady state values.
For the capital stock to be constant, investment needs to be strictly positive to o¤set
depreciation. In steady state, the real price of capital pKt must therefore be equal to
1. Hence, the real interest rate is just equal to the marginal product of capital net
of depreciation, cf. (16). Note that, by (1), when pKt = 1, wealth net of government
liabilities at   (bt +mt) must be equal to the stock of physical capital K.
The simplest way to characterize the steady state equilibria of the economy is to
look at it through the lens of the Aggregate Demand - Aggregate Supply paradigm.
Fundamentally, aggregate demand is given by y = c + K, while aggregate supply is
given by y = F (K;L). I therefore need compute these levels of demand and supply
for each rate  of ination. For this, I will rely on the characterization of (c; l; L;K;w)
as a function of the real interest rate r, which is jointly obtained from the optimality
conditions for consumption (8) with _ct = 0 and at   (bt +mt) = K and for labor supply
(9), from the demand for labor (15) and for capital (16), and from the expression for the
real wage (36).
Clearly, if ination is high enough, then the zero lower bound on the nominal interest
rate is not binding and the real interest rate can be su¢ ciently small to induce the
economy to produce at full capacity. Let  denote the smallest rate of ination such
9Recall that mst is equal to e
R t
0
(s s)dsM0=P0, which is why t and t do enter the intertemporal
government budget constraint.
10If it = 0, then rt =  t. If t < R, then ination determines the gap between wt and FL (Kt; lt),
through (36). Thus, in these two cases, steady state ination must be constant. And, if it > 0 and
t  R, then money is super-neutral. Hence, there is no loss of generality in considering that ination
is constant over time.
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that the zero lower bound is not binding. I assume that  > , which implies that the
ination ceiling  is not high enough to allow the economy to produce at full capacity.
Recall that, by (34), the reference rate of ination R is assumed to be lower than the
ination ceiling . We therefore have:
 >   R. (37)
By (15) and (36), the labor market clears, i.e. L = l, when  2 R;+1, but fails to
clear, i.e. L < l, when  2  R   ; R. We can therefore distinguish three intervals
of interest. When  2 [;+1), the frictions are irrelevant. When  2 R; , the zero
lower bound is binding but the labor market clears. Finally, when  2  R   ; R, the
zero lower bound is binding and the labor market does not clear.11
Thus, when  2 [;+1), the economy must be in a frictionless equilibrium.
Lemma 1 A steady state frictionless equilibrium always exists and, if  is su¢ ciently
close to zero and labor supply is su¢ ciently inelastic, then it must be unique.
Note that, even if  is high and labor supply is highly elastic, it is di¢ cult to nd a
counter-example with multiple equilibria. I therefore consider throughout my analysis
that the frictionless equilibrium is unique.
Let rn denote the natural real interest rate, i.e. the real interest rate of the frictionless
equilibrium. Recall that (c; l; L;K;w) can be characterized as a function of the real
interest rate. The natural rate rn is therefore determined such as to equate aggregate
demand y = c + K to aggregate supply y = F (K;L). The corresponding nominal
interest rate is given by i = rn + . By denition,  is the smallest rate of ination at
which frictions are irrelevant. Hence, when ination is equal to , we must have i = 0.
This implies that  =  rn.12
When  > , the frictionless equilibrium is inconsistent with the ination ceiling .
The condition that  >  is fundamentally an assumption on the natural real interest
rate, which must satisfy rn =   <  . In particular, if   0, the natural rate must
be negative. The optimality condition for consumption (8) implies that, in steady state,
r =    0 (K) =u0 (c). Hence, if  is su¢ ciently small, the real interest rate is indeed
likely to be negative. This shows that the preference for wealth decreases the natural
real interest rate to such an extent that it can easily make the frictionless equilibrium
inconsistent with the ination ceiling .
11Recall that, by the wage rigidity constraint (35),   R  is inconsistent with the existence of an
equilibrium.
12It can easily be shown that  < . In equilibrium, the marginal product of capital FK (K;L) must be
strictly positive. Hence, by (16), we must have rn+  = FK (K;L) > 0, which implies that  =  rn < .
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When  2 R; , the labor market clears but the real interest is excessively high, as
r = i   > 0   =  rn. Under mild conditions, this is inconsistent with the existence
of a steady state equilibrium.
Lemma 2 Aggregate demand y = c + K is strictly smaller than aggregate supply y =
F (K;L) for all  2 R;  provided that  is su¢ ciently close to zero and either that
labor supply is su¢ ciently inelastic or that c > K for all r 2 [rn; ].13
Note that, if consumption c is greater than investment K and if  > , then c > K.
We can now prove the existence and uniqueness of a steady state equilibrium for
 2  R   ; R provided that wages are su¢ ciently sticky, i.e. provided that  is
su¢ ciently small. I consider that the growth rate of the money supply is su¢ ciently
strong to have a binding zero lower bound in steady state equilibrium.14 Indeed, aggregate
demand would be even more depressed with a strictly positive nominal interest rate.
Lemma 3 If aggregate demand is strictly smaller than aggregate supply when  = R
(as implied by Lemma 2) and if  < R + , then there exists at least one steady state
equilibrium such that  2  R   ; R. If  is su¢ ciently close to zero, this must be the
unique steady state equilibrium with i = 0 and  < .
I henceforth consider that the secular stagnation equilibrium is unique. When  2 
R   ; R, the wage rigidity constraint is binding, which implies that rms labor
demand L is smaller than households labor supply l. This clearly shows that, in the
secular stagnation equilibrium, the economy fails to produce at full capacity.
Figure 1 displays the aggregate demand and aggregate supply curves, assuming that
i = 0 and r =   for all  2  R   ; . When  2 [;+1), the zero lower bound
is not binding. The economy therefore is in the frictionless equilibrium where the real
interest rate adjusts such as to equate aggregate demand to aggregate supply. Hence, the
two curves overlap at the natural level of output for all  2 [;+1).
By Lemma 2, we know that aggregate supply is greater than aggregate demand when-
ever  2 R; . Note that, as the real interest rate increases from   to  R, aggregate
supply can either rise or fall. On the one hand, an increase in the real rate reduces K=L,
by (16), which contracts aggregate supply y = F (K;L) = LF (K=L; 1). On the other
13The consumption Euler equation (8) implies that in steady state r  , which is why we can ignore
the possibility that r > .
14A su¢ cient condition is  2 R; . Indeed, to have a steady state equilibrium with i > 0, ination
must be equal to the money growth rate, by (10) and (28). Hence, if  =  2 R;  and i > 0, then
r = i    >   >   = rn. But, by Lemma 2, there is no steady state equilibrium with r > rn and
 2 R; . Hence, when  2 R; , there is no steady state equilibrium with i > 0.
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hand, a higher real rate reduces the demand for consumption, by (8), which can raise the
supply of labor, by (9), which expands aggregate supply, since L = l when   R.15
Finally, assuming that wages are su¢ ciently sticky, we know by Lemma 3 that an
equilibrium always exists for some  2  R   ; R. Indeed, as ination falls from R to
R , labor demand L shrinks from l to 0, by (36). The capital stockK also falls in order
to maintain a capital-labor ratio K=L consistent with the real interest rate r =  , by
(16). This generates a much stronger contraction in aggregate supply than in aggregate
demand, as the fall in K and L does not a¤ect the consumption component of aggregate
demand.
Figure 1: Aggregate Demand (AD) and Aggregate Supply (AS) curves
If the government does not allow ination to rise above its ceiling  2 R; ,
then the only feasible steady state equilibrium of the economy is the secular stagnation
equilibrium with  2  R   ; R. The economy is therefore confronted with persistent
under-employment, as L < l, and with an ination rate that is persistently below the
ceiling.
15In theory, aggregate demand can also be decreasing in ination for some  2 R; . This is due
to the investment component of aggregate demand, which is equal to  (K=L)L. However, this e¤ect is
unlikely to dominate as the consumption component typically is strongly increasing in ination.
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Let us now characterize the monetary policy that is consistent with the di¤erent
equilibria of the economy. In a frictionless equilibrium with  2 (;+1), the nominal
interest rate is constant and strictly positive, as i = rn +  > rn +  = 0. The money
demand equation (10) therefore implies that real money balancesmt must also be constant
over time. But, by the money market clearing condition (28), this requires the growth
rate t of the money supply to be equal to the ination rate . We must therefore have
 =  2 (;+1) The initial price level P0 is then trivially determined by:
P0 =
M0
m
, (38)
where m is given by the money demand equation (10) with i = rn + , while M0 is
exogenously given.16
In the secular stagnation equilibrium, the zero lower bound is binding. Thus, the
money demand equation (10) implies that mt  m. The initial price level must therefore
satisfy M0=P0  m or, equivalently, P0  M0= m. Indeed, when i = 0, money and bonds
are perfect substitutes. Hence, while the transaction demand for money never rises above
m, the extra money suppliedmt  m  0 can be used for savings. Assuming that, initially,
households exclusively rely on bonds for savings, the price level must be given by:
P0 =
M0
m
. (39)
In that case, to have an equilibriumwith i = 0, the real supply of money e
R t
0 (s )dsM0=P0 =
e
R t
0 (s )ds m must always be greater or equal to m. Hence, such an equilibrium with a
given rate  2  R   ; R of ination is consistent with any path of the growth rate
of the money supply that satises
R t
0
(s   ) ds  0 for all t. Thus, if the central bank
adopts a constant growth rate  of the money supply, then a liquidity trap equilibrium
with ination  2  R   ; R requires   .
The last remaining possibility is to have a frictionless equilibriumwith ination exactly
equal to . In that case, the nominal interest rate is equal to zero. Hence, in theory, a
rise in the money supply is not necessarily inationary. However, if a strictly positive
mass of households decides to spend the extra money supplied, rather than save it, then
ination and the nominal interest rate both rise. Thus, the liquidity trap equilibrium with
ination equal to  is not stable. This is fundamentally due to the fact that, although
16It is well known (cf. Obstfeld and Rogo¤ 1983) that several paths of the price level are consistent
with a given path of the money supply. I choose to focus on the path of the price level that results in a
constant rate of ination. This equilibrium selection is consistent with the quantity theory of money as
a once-and-for-all increase in the money supply results in a once-and-for-all increase in the price level of
the same magnitude (cf. Kocherlakota and Phelan 1999). But, by (10), (28), and it = rn+ t, any path
of t and t that satisfy h
0

e
R t
0
(s s)dsM0=P0

= [rn + t]u
0 (c) with t   for all t is consistent with
the steady state frictionless equilibrium.
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the nominal interest rate is equal to zero, the zero lower bound is not binding as it is not
preventing the nominal rate from being negative. We can therefore consider that, in a
frictionless equilibrium with i = 0 and  = , the real quantity of money must be exactly
equal to m and the growth rate of the money supply must be exactly equal to . In that
case, the initial price level P0 is equal to M0= m.
Finally, we need to check that the representative households intertemporal budget
constraint (6) and transversality condition (11) are both satised. Recall that the lump-
sum transfer adjusts such as to balance the intertemporal government budget constraint.
It follows that the governments no-Ponzi condition (22) holds with equality. But, in
steady state, the real interest rate is constant and the wealth of the representative house-
hold is given by at = K + bt +mt. It immediately follows that:
lim
t!1
e 
R t
0 rsdsat = lim
t!1
e rtK + lim
t!1
e rt (bt +mt) ;
= lim
t!1
e rtK  0: (40)
The households intertemporal budget constraint is therefore binding when r > 0, but
not when r  0.
The optimality condition for consumption (8) implies that, in steady state,   r. It
follows that:
lim
t!1
e tu0 (ct) at = lim
t!1
e tu0 (c) (K + bt +mt) ;
= lim
t!1
e tu0 (c)K + lim
t!1
e ( r)tu0 (c) e rt (bt +mt) ;
= 0 +

lim
t!1
e ( r)tu0 (c)

lim
t!1
e rt (bt +mt)

;
= 0: (41)
Thus, the households transversality condition is always satised, even when its budget
constraint is not binding. This conrms the optimality of the behavior of the represen-
tative household.
2.6.2 Stability of Equilibrium
We have shown that there are essentially two steady state equilibria: a frictionless steady
state that requires ination to be greater or equal to  and a secular stagnation steady
state with ination smaller than R. I now investigate the stability properties of these
equilibria.
In a world with no lower bound on the real interest rate and no downward wage rigidity,
any steady state equilibrium must be frictionless. If there is a unique frictionless steady
state and if labor supply is inelastic, then a phase diagram reveals that the frictionless
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equilibrium must be globally saddle-path stable. By continuity, this must also be true if
labor supply is su¢ ciently inelastic.17
Let us now turn to the stability of the secular stagnation steady state, which is
the only feasible steady state equilibrium under the ination ceiling .18 If the zero
lower bound and the downward wage rigidity are both binding and if the real price
pKt of capital is equal to 1, then the secular stagnation steady state is locally unstable
provided that  is close to zero, i.e. that wages are very rigid, and that in steady state
 K00 (K) =0 (K) <  cu00 (c) =u0 (c).19 This can easily be seen in the special case where
 is equal to 0, which implies that ination must be equal to R, and where the marginal
utility of wealth is constant, i.e. 
00
(K) = 0. Let us assume for a contradiction that
the economy converges to its secular stagnation steady state. With constant ination
and constant marginal utility of wealth, the consumption Euler equation (8) implies that
consumption immediately jumps to its steady state value c. Similarly, the demand for
capital (16) implies that the capital-labor ratio Kt=Lt also immediately jumps to its
steady state value K=L. The capital accumulation equation could then be written as:
_Kt = F (Kt; Lt)  Kt   ct;
= Kt

F

1;
1
K=L

  

  c: (42)
Clearly, if Kt is above its steady state value K, then Kt must diverge o¤ to innity; while
if Kt is below K, then it must diverge towards zero.
However, physical capital is the only state variable of the economy. Also, if there is
an upper bound to labor supply, then physical capital must belong to a closed interval.
Hence, if an equilibrium exists, then physical capital must be converging towards a steady
state.20 It follows that in the neighborhood of the secular stagnation steady state, we
must either have a non-binding wage rigidity constraint or pKt < 1.
21
Let us rst consider the scenario where the economy is in the frictionless equilibrium
with ination  and where the central bank unexpectedly lowers the ination ceiling to
. The real interest rate immediately increases to , which is higher than the marginal
17It can also be shown, by linearizing (8) with rt = FK (Kt; lt)   and at   (bt +mt) = Kt and (24)
with yt = F (Kt; lt) around the steady state (c;K) while using (9) with wt = FL (Kt; lt) to express lt as
a function of ct and Kt that, if a steady state satises rn = FK (K; l)    0 and c > K, then it must
be locally saddle-path stable.
18I am now implicitly assuming that the growth rate of the money supply is su¢ ciently high to avoid
having a steady state with a positive nominal interest rate and  < . By footnote 14, a su¢ cient
condition for this is  2 R; .
19This can be shown by linearizing the system around the secular stagnation steady state.
20As in the standard Ramsey model, Kt = 0 is not a stable steady state equilibrium.
21Note that, as the zero lower bound is binding in the secular stagnation steady state, we cannot have
a strictly positive nominal rate while the economy is asymptotically converging to that steady state.
Hence, we cannot relax the assumption that it = 0, while considering that the wage rigidity constraint
is binding and that pKt = 1.
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product of capital net of depreciation. But, by arbitrage, the returns from holding bonds
must always be equal to the returns from holding physical capital, cf. (4) and (14). The
price pKt of capital must therefore fall below 1 such as to satisfy the following relationship
between the real interest rate  t and the marginal product of capital:
 t = FK (Kt; Lt)
pKt
   + _p
K
t
pKt
: (43)
Aggregate investment drops to zero. The capital stock therefore falls are rate , since
_Kt =  Kt. Both the fall in the capital stock and the higher real interest rate reduce
consumption. This results in a sharp contraction in aggregate demand and, therefore,
in the demand for labor, which in the absence of investment is implicitly determined by
F (Kt; Lt) = ct. The fall in labor demand below labor supply induces ination to drop
below R.
The capital stock falls until it reaches the secular stagnation steady state. At this
point, the price of capital becomes equal to 1, and investment becomes positive. This
induces a discrete rise in labor demand, which raises the marginal product of capital and
equates it to the steady state real interest rate.
If the initial stock of capital is below the secular stagnation steady state, then it must
be rising. This requires positive investment and, hence, a price of capital pKt equal to
1. To avoid diverging away from the steady state, the downward wage rigidity must not
be binding. Hence, the economy must be operating at full capacity, with L = l, while
converging towards secular stagnation. The dynamics of the frictionless economy are at
work, except that the economy is not on a path converging to the frictionless steady state.
Once the capital stock reaches its secular stagnation value, the economy suddenly stalls.
Indeed, investors know that any further increase in the capital stock will eventually result
in the price of capital dropping below 1 and, hence, in a capital loss.
Once in secular stagnation, investment drops as _Kt, which was strictly positive, sud-
denly becomes equal to zero. This generates a fall in labor demand, which becomes
smaller than labor supply. This raises the capital-labor ratio. The real interest rate
therefore falls, such that in steady state r =   2   R;   R   . Importantly, this
implies that the real interest rate just before falling into secular stagnation was higher
than  R and, hence, higher than the lower bound  .
Interestingly, both the convergence from above or from below imply that the secular
stagnation steady state is reached in nite time.
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3 Properties of the Secular Stagnation Equilibrium
If the central bank does not allow ination to rise above , with  <  =  rn, then the
economymust eventually fall into the secular stagnation steady state. Before investigating
its properties, I begin by deriving a useful comparative statics result. We expect an
exogenous rise in the real interest rate to reduce both consumption and output.22 The
following lemma provides a necessary and su¢ cient condition for this.
Lemma 4 In the secular stagnation steady state, an exogenous rise in the real interest
rate reduces both consumption and output if and only if  K00 (K) =0 (K) <  cu00 (c) =u0 (c).
Throughout my analysis, I therefore assume that, in the secular stagnation steady state,
 K00 (K) =0 (K) <  cu00 (c) =u0 (c). This condition must be satised for all the propo-
sitions of this section to hold. It does indeed seem natural to consider that the utility of
wealth is less concave than the utility of consumption.
Under secular stagnation, the economy is permanently depressed with some unem-
ployed labor resources. However, the fact that the labor demand of rms is persistently
below the labor supply of workers is not fundamentally due to the wage rigidity. Indeed,
when wages are more exible, the economy is more depressed. This is known as the
paradox of exibility, which is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In the secular stagnation equilibrium, if  is su¢ ciently close to zero,
then a rise in , i.e. a rise in wage exibility, reduces ination, which lowers the output
level.
The intuition for the result is straightforward. If wages are more exible, then deation
is stronger. This raises the real interest rate, which reduces the demand for consumption
and for investment, resulting in a lower output level. Note that the su¢ cient condition
of the proposition, that  is su¢ ciently close to zero, is far from necessary.23
The downward wage rigidity breaks the deationary spiral and is therefore necessary
to have a steady state equilibrium, as shown by Lemma 3. However, it is clearly not
22The exogenous rise in the steady state real interest rate can be due to a reduction in the growth
rate of the money supply that raises the nominal rate. If  is su¢ ciently close to zero, i.e. if the interval 
R   ; R is su¢ ciently small, then the rise in the nominal interest rate i must also unambiguously
raise the real interest rate i  , since  2  R   ; R.
23To overturn the result with an  signicantly greater than zero, the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution of consumption or the elasticity of labor of labor supply must be so large that a fall in
ination reduces consumption and, hence, labor demand or raises labor supply so much that ination
decreases by an even larger amount. Thus, in equilibrium, a rise in  must raise ination such as to
increase labor demand or reduce labor supply. This generates an upward pressure on ination that is
partially o¤set by the downward pressure that is mechanically triggered by the rise in . This mechanism
seems extremely implausible. A similar reasoning implies that Proposition 2, 3, and, 4, below, also are
much more robust than the su¢ cient condition suggests.
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the friction at the origin of the economic depression. Secular stagnation is instead due
to a lack of demand resulting from the lower bound on the real interest rate. Indeed,
the preference for wealth induces households to have such a high propensity to save that,
in the absence of frictions, a very low real interest rate is necessary to raise aggregate
demand to the level of aggregate supply. In a nutshell, the gap between labor supply and
labor demand is not primarily due to the wage being too high, it is instead due to the
real interest rate being too high.
The ination ceiling  induces the economy to fall into secular stagnation, where the
real interest rate r =   2   R;   R    is essentially determined by the downward
wage rigidity. At this interest rate, which is actually strictly higher than the lower bound
 , aggregate demand is very weak. Hence, the labor demand L of rms falls below
the labor supply l of workers to equate aggregate supply to the weak level of aggregate
demand. Output is essentially demand determined.
To understand why a lack of demand can reduce the output level of the economy, it
is important to realize that a rise in the propensity to save does not necessarily translate
into higher investment. In fact, under secular stagnation, a rise in the intensity of the
preference for wealth reduces investment. This is known as the paradox of thrift, which
is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the secular stagnation equilibrium, if  is su¢ ciently close to zero,
then a rise in the marginal utility of wealth reduces both consumption and investment.
Indeed, a rise in the propensity to save reduces consumption, which contracts the level
of aggregate demand, which in turn reduces the labor demand of rms. In the limit as
 tends to zero, the real interest rate remains equal to  R and the capital-labor ratio
must remain constant. This requires a fall in the capital stock and, hence, in steady
state investment. If  is positive, the reduction in aggregate demand decreases ination,
which amplies the contraction in both consumption and investment. Thus, a rise in the
marginal utility of wealth lowers the equilibrium level of wealth!
By contrast, in the frictionless equilibrium, a rise in the supply of savings, due to an
increase in the marginal utility of wealth, reduces the equilibrium real interest rate. This
raises the stock of capital. It also raises consumption provided that, initially, the capital
stock is not too high.24 In the absence of frictions, we therefore have the usual result that
a rise in the propensity to save raises investment and the capital stock. The fundamental
24By totally di¤erentiating the equations that characterize the frictionless steady state equilibrium, it
can be shown that a su¢ cient condition to have the capital stock K increasing in the marginal utility
of wealth is that the natural real interest rate is negative (or positive but su¢ ciently close to zero)
and either that labor supply is su¢ ciently inelastic or that c > K. In that case, consumption c is
also increasing in the marginal utility of wealth provided that the natural real interest rate is not too
negative, i.e. provided that the capital stock is not too high.
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problem under secular stagnation is that the real interest rate is determined by ination,
and hence by the downward wage rigidity, rather than by the supply and demand for
loans.
When the economy su¤ers from a lack of demand, expansionary supply shocks can be
contractionary. This is the paradox of toil, which is formalized in the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 3 In the secular stagnation equilibrium, if  is su¢ ciently close to zero:
 A fall in the disutility of labor reduces consumption, investment and, hence, output;
 Under a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function, a rise in total factor produc-
tivity reduces consumption, investment and, hence, output.
A rise in the supply of labor l, decreases the marginal product of labor at full capacity
FL (K; l). By the binding wage rigidity constraint (33), this reduces the growth rate of
nominal wages and, hence, the ination rate. The corresponding rise in the real interest
rate r =   generates a contraction in the demand for consumption and for investment.
The e¤ect of a rise in total factor productivity is slightly more complex. On the
one hand, it mechanically raises the marginal product of capital, which induces rms to
raise their capital-labor ratio K=L. On the other hand, thanks to higher productivity
and to more capital per worker, the amount of labor L necessary to meet the demand for
consumption falls. It turns out that, with a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function,
these two e¤ects exactly cancel out and, hence, total factor productivity has no direct
impact on investment K. However, a higher total factor productivity raises the marginal
product of labor FL (K;L), which increases the labor supply l of workers.25 As before,
this reduces ination, which generates a contraction in the demand for consumption and
for investment.
In a nutshell, an expansionary supply shock cannot raise output if it fails to generate
a corresponding increase in aggregate demand. The problem is that, under secular stag-
nation, the real interest rate is determined by ination. By contrast, in the frictionless
equilibrium, the real interest rate adjusts such as to equate aggregate demand to aggre-
gate supply. Thus, in the absence of frictions, a rise in the supply of labor induces a fall
in the real interest rate such as to generate a rise in the demand for consumption and for
investment.26
25Recall that, by (9) and (15), we have v0 (l) = FL (K;L)u0 (c).
26It can be shown that in the frictionless equilibrium, if the real interest rate is negative (or positive
but su¢ ciently close to zero), c > K, and  K00 (K) =0 (K) <  cu00 (c) =u0 (c), then a fall in the
disutility of labor raises consumption, investment, and output. Also, if the real interest rate is negative
(or positive but su¢ ciently close to zero), labor supply is su¢ ciently inelastic, and  K00 (K) =0 (K) <
 cu00 (c) =u0 (c), then a rise in total factor productivity raises output. Note that these su¢ cient conditions
are far from necessary.
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4 Policy Analysis
In the absence of government intervention, the economy is bound to remain permanently
depressed. In this section, I therefore investigate the e¤ectiveness of various stimulative
policies. As the objective is to permanently escape secular stagnation, I focus on the
long-run impact of these policies on the steady state equilibrium of the economy and
abstract from transitional dynamics.
The obvious solution to secular stagnation would be to raise the ination ceiling  to
at least . However, recent history has shown that, for political and institutional reasons,
this is typically not an option, even in crisis struck countries.
When the nominal interest rate is equal to zero, increasing the money supply through
open market operations, i.e. by buying bonds, does not have any e¤ect on the economy.
Indeed, when i = 0, consumerstransaction demand for real money balances is satiated
and money and bonds are perfect substitutes. Hence, any further increase in the money
supply is used for savings: the economy is liquidity trapped!
An alternative policy option would be to implement a helicopter drop of money, i.e. to
give households a scal transfer nanced through an increase in the money supply. This
policy violates the conservative version of the governments no-Ponzi condition (22).27
Hence, it is only feasible if the government does not have to be able to redeem the
outstanding money supply.
This policy increases both the wealth of households and the level of government li-
abilities. If households perceive the money supply as a government liability, then the
helicopter drop of money does not increase their net wealth at   (bst +mst) and, hence,
cannot have any impact on the level of economic activity. If, on the contrary, households
do not perceive the money supply as a government liability, then the policy raises their
wealth, which reduces their marginal utility of wealth, and increases their demand for
consumption, by the Euler equation (8) with _ct = 0. If the transfers are su¢ ciently large
to induce the economy to produce at full capacity, then the increase in the money supply
must be highly inationary, which is inconsistent with the low ination ceiling. Thus, the
helicopter drop of money does not seem to be a completely satisfactory solution to secular
stagnation. Also, note that, in the special case where the marginal utility of wealth is
constant, the policy is always completely ine¤ective.
The remaining conventional stabilization policy is to implement a scal stimulus. Let
us therefore consider that the government relies on lump-sum taxes to nance a level g
of government spending.28 Aggregate demand becomes equal to c+ K + g. Note that a
27Let (bt;mt)
1
t=0 denote the pre-existing paths of real debt and money, which satisfy the conservative
no-Ponzi condition limt!1 e rt (bt +mt) = 0. The implementation of the helicopter drop of money at
time 0 raises the initial real money supply by ~m0. Hence, it increases the real government liabilities at
time t by ~mt = ~m0P0=Pt = ~m0e t = ~m0ert. We therefore have limt!1 e rt (bt +mt + ~mt) = ~m0 > 0.
28If, alternatively, the government spending is nanced through increases in the money supply, then
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temporary increase in government expenditures cannot remedy secular stagnation. The
increase in government spending must therefore be permanent.
Let "u =  cu00 (c) =u0 (c) and " =  K00 (K) =0 (K). In the presence of government
spending, an exogenous rise in the real interest rate reduces both consumption and output
if and only if (c+ g) "u > c", which is a generalization of Lemma 4. Throughout this
section, I assume that this condition is satised.
Proposition 4 In the secular stagnation equilibrium, in the limit as  tends to zero, i.e.
when wages are completely rigid, the steady state government spending multiplier is equal
to:
1 +
K + c "
"u
(c+ g)  c "
"u
: (44)
If  is strictly positive, but su¢ ciently small, then government spending raises ination,
which generates an even larger multiplier.
In the limit as  tends to zero, nominal wages grow at rate R and the real interest rate
is therefore equal to  R. In that case, government spending cannot a¤ect the capital-
labor ratio, by (16). Instead, a rise in g increases aggregate demand, which raises the
demand for labor. But, to keep the capital-labor ratio constant, the capital stock must
rise. So investment also rises. Hence, even when ination does not respond to government
spending, the multiplier is larger than 1. With a decreasing marginal utility of wealth, i.e.
" > 0, this e¤ect is amplied as the increase in the capital stock reduces the marginal
utility of wealth, which raises the demand for consumption.
If wages are not completely rigid, then the increase in labor demand raises ination.
This spurs the demand for both consumption and investment, which further increases
output.
However, a sizeable scal multiplier does not necessarily imply that the implementa-
tion of a scal stimulus is welfare enhancing.
Proposition 5 In the secular stagnation equilibrium, in the limit as  tends to zero, i.e.
when wages are completely rigid, a rise in government spending is welfare enhancing if
and only if:29
K

+ R

1  v
0 (L)
v0 (l)

+ c
"
"u
> [c+ g]
v0 (L)
v0 (l)
; (45)
where v0 (L) =v0 (l)  1 for all L  l.
the resulting policy can be seen as the joint implementation of the last two policies: a helicopter drop of
money together with the scal stimulus nanced from lump-sum taxes.
29This condition holds for any value of g, where c, l, L, and K implicitly are functions of g. It follows
that the optimal value of g is such that the two sides of the inequality are equal to each other.
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A rise in government spending a¤ects welfare through three channels. First, to meet
the higher level of demand, employment L rises. Agents work more, which reduces
their welfare. Second, when wages are rigid, the capital-labor ratio is constant and the
capital stock must therefore rise. This raises the wealth of households, net of government
liabilities, which is welfare enhancing. Finally, if " > 0, the increase in wealth raises the
demand for consumption, which is also welfare enhancing. However, even when g = 0, it
is not clear whether the positive e¤ects dominate.
If labor supply is completely inelastic, then v0 (L) =v0 (l) = 0 for all L < l. This implies
that working more hours whenever L < l is not costly. Hence, increasing g always raises
welfare as long as L < l. This yields the following corollary.
Corollary 1 If labor supply is completely inelastic, then the optimal scal stimulus elim-
inates the gap between labor demand L and labor supply l.
It is important to realize that, even if " = 0, i.e. even if consumption is independent of g,
eliminating under-employment is welfare enhancing as it raises the wealth of households
while the disutility from supplying labor up to l is negligible.
If labor supply is innitely elastic, then v0 (L) =v0 (l) = 1. In that case, under the
mild condition that c [1  "="u] > K, the implementation of any scal stimulus is
detrimental to welfare, despite a multiplier that is larger than 1. By continuity, this
result must also hold for a su¢ ciently high elasticity of labor supply.
Corollary 2 If in the secular stagnation equilibrium c [1  "="u] > K and if labor
supply is highly elastic, then the implementation of a scal stimulus reduces welfare.
Thus, starting from a positive level of government spending, it would actually be desirable
to cut government expenditures. This would allow workers to enjoy even more leisure.
Arguably, for plausible calibrations, v0 (L) =v0 (l) is unlikely to be very close to zero,
even when g = 0. For instance, a severe depression, where labor demand is only 75%
of labor supply, together with a Frisch elasticity of labor supply of 0.5 implies that
v0 (L) =v0 (l) = (0:75)1=0:5 = 0:5625. Of course, the case for a scal stimulus is stronger
if wages are not completely sticky. However, the absence of outright deation in almost
any country during the Great Recession suggests that, in practice, ination is not very
responsive to government spending. All this suggests that, under secular stagnation, the
case for a scal stimulus is, at best, weak.
My analysis of the scal stimulus so far assumes that the economy remains in the sec-
ular stagnation equilibrium. However, an increase in government spending raises the real
interest rate of the frictionless equilibrium.30 Thus, a scal stimulus that is su¢ ciently
30It can be shown that a su¢ cient condition for this is c+ g  K and f 0 (k)    0.
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large to raise the frictionless interest rate from   to   makes the frictionless equilib-
rium consistent with the ination ceiling . Note that, to implement this equilibrium,
the money supply must be growing at rate .
Of course, this policy does not eliminate the secular stagnation equilibrium. The
di¢ culty is to make sure that the economy converges to the frictionless equilibrium. If
this does not spontaneously occur, the government can eliminate the secular stagnation
equilibrium by committing to prevent ination from falling below R. Indeed, at any point
in time, it can always spend su¢ ciently to eliminate the gap between labor demand L and
labor supply l, which raises ination to at least R, by (36). In theory, if this commitment
is fully credible, households expect the economy to converge to the frictionless steady
state with ination . In practice, it might be very di¢ cult for a government to credibly
commit to spend su¢ ciently to prevent the occurrence of a steady state with under-
employed workers.31
5 Optimal Policy
To lift the economy out of secular stagnation, we clearly need to look beyond the usual
set of policy instruments used for macroeconomic stabilization. Hence, I now characterize
the optimal policy under a much richer set of taxes and subsidies. I proceed in two steps.
First, I determine the optimal allocation of resources. I then solve for the scal policy
that implements this allocation in the decentralized economy.
5.1 Optimal Allocation
Wealth can either be held in the form of physical capital Kt, bonds bt, or money mt.
Hence, in equilibrium, the private wealth of households net of government liabilities must
be equal to Kt. The planners problem is to maximize the welfare of the representative
household: Z 1
0
e t [u (ct)  v (lt) + h (mt) +  (Kt)] dt; (46)
subject to the resource constraint given by the capital accumulation equation:
_Kt = F (Kt; lt)  Kt   ct; (47)
where I have used the fact that, in a rst-best allocation, the labor used in production
Lt must be equal to the labor supplied by workers lt. By the maximum principle, for any
31In the late 1930s, Hansen (1939) believed that the U.S. economy was trapped into a secular stagnation
equilibrium. A possible interpretation of the subsequent history is that the military spending of World
War II allowed the economy to escape secular stagnation, while the build-up of the welfare state after
WWII may have been su¢ cient to allow the economy to produce at full capacity.
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initial stock K0 of capital, the rst-best allocation (ct ; K

t ; l

t ;m

t ) is characterized by:
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_Kt = F (K

t ; l

t )  Kt   ct ; (48)
_ct
ct
=

FK (K

t ; l

t )     +
0 (Kt )
u0 (c)

u0 (ct )
 u00 (ct ) ct
; (49)
v0 (lt ) = FL (K

t ; l

t )u
0 (ct ) ; (50)
h0 (mt ) = 0; (51)
together with the transversality condition:
lim
t!1
e tu0 (ct )K

t = 0: (52)
Money has no impact on the allocation of resources, but is valued by consumers who
derive utility from holding money. Hence, the rst-best allocation satiates individuals
with real money balances.
These equations correspond to the frictionless equilibrium of the decentralized econ-
omy where consumption is given by (8) with rt = FK (Kt; lt)   and at  (bt +mt) = Kt,
labor supply by (9) with wt = FL (Kt; lt), and where aggregate supply F (Kt; lt) is equal
to aggregate demand ct + Kt + _Kt. Also, given the money demand equation (10), to
have h0 (mt) = 0 in a decentralized economy, we need to have it = 0, i.e. the Friedman
(1969) rule needs to hold. This establishes the following result.
Proposition 6 The frictionless equilibrium with it = 0 does implement the rst-best
allocation of resources.
We have previously established that, under mild conditions, the frictionless steady state
is unique and stable. We can therefore consider that the rst-best allocation converges
to that steady state.
Let rnt denote the natural real interest rate of the frictionless equilibrium, dened as:
rnt = FK (K

t ; l

t )  : (53)
Recall that, to have secular stagnation with   0, the steady state natural real interest
rate must be negative, i.e. rn =   <    0. This implies that, in the rst-best
steady state, the capital stock must be above the golden rule level. However, this is fully
e¢ cient as households derive utility from holding real wealth.
32It is straightforward to check that the Hamiltonian is strictly concave in ct, lt, mt, and Kt and that
the corresponding current-value costate variable is equal to u0 (ct) and that it is therefore always strictly
positive. Hence (by Acemoglu 2009, Theorem 7.14, page 257), for a given value of K0, the optimality
conditions dene the unique solution to the optimal control problem.
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5.2 Implementation in the Decentralized Economy
For simplicity, rms are assumed to rent capital owned by households. As investment is
always positive in the rst-best allocation that I want to implement, I assume that the
price of capital is always equal to that of consumption goods, i.e. pKt = P
K
t =Pt = 1.
A capital income tax Kt is imposed on the income from physical capital RtKt net of a
depreciation allowance 'tPtKt, where, as before, Rt denotes the nominal rental cost of
capital.33 Under full depreciation allowance, we have 't = 1. There is an investment sub-
sidy sIt . As we shall see, this reduces the e¤ective price of capital at time t to Pt
 
1  sIt

.
The e¤ective nominal wealth of a household is therefore equal to:
At =
 
1  sIt

PtKt +Bt +Mt: (54)
This wealth is taxed at rate Wt at each point in time.
34 Finally, households are subject
to a labor income tax Lt and to a consumption tax 
C
t .
This scal policy implies that the nominal wealth PtKt+Bt+Mt of the representative
household evolves according to:
Pt _Kt + _PtKt + _Bt + _Mt (55)
= itBt +

RtKt   Kt [RtKt   'tPtKt] + sIt
h
Pt _Kt + PtKt
i
  PtKt + _PtKt

 Wt
 
1  sIt

PtKt +Bt +Mt

+
 
1  Lt

Wtlt + Pt t  
 
1 + Ct

Ptct;
where nominal investment is equal to Pt _Kt+PtKt. Using the fact that _Bt=Pt = _bt+tbt
and _Mt=Pt = _mt + tmt, this can be written in real terms as: 
1  sIt

_Kt   _sItKt + _bt + _mt =
 
it   t   Wt
  
1  sIt

Kt + bt +mt

(56)
+
 
1  Kt

Rt=Pt + 
K
t 't  
 
1  sIt

   _sIt  
 
1  sIt

(it   t)

Kt
 itmt +
 
1  Lt

wtlt +  t  
 
1 + Ct

ct:
This expression does conrm that the e¤ective real price of capital is
 
1  sIt

. By
arbitrage, the returns from holding capital should be identical to the returns from holding
bonds. Thus, the second term on the right hand side of (56) must be equal to zero, which
yields the following relationship between the real interest rate and the user cost of capital:
rt =
 
1  Kt

Rt=Pt + 
K
t 't   _sIt
1  sIt
  : (57)
33If rms were the owners of capital, then Kt would correspond to a corporate income tax.
34In the optimal allocation, the nominal return from wealth is equal to zero and the real return is
negative (as, in steady state, rn <    0). Hence, in that context, it seems more natural to tax the
stock of wealth rather than the (negative) income from wealth.
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The wealth accumulation equation simplies to:
_at =
 
rt   Wt

at   itmt +
 
1  Lt

wtlt +  t  
 
1 + Ct

ct; (58)
where at = At=Pt. The corresponding no-Ponzi condition is:
lim
t!1
e 
R t
0(rs Ws )dsat  0: (59)
Finally, householdsintertemporal utility is given by:
Z 1
0
e t
"
u (ct)  v (lt) + h

mt
1 + Ct

+ 
 
at  
 
bst +m
s
t   sItKt

1 + Ct
!#
dt; (60)
where I assume that they care about the value of money and wealth at consumer prices,
including consumption taxes. The sum of the wealth of the private and of the public
sector must always be equal to the stock of physical capital. Hence, the government
liabilities at t are equal to bst +m
s
t   sItKt, where bst , mst , and Kt are aggregate quantities
that are outside the control of any single household.
The consumers problem is to maximize utility, (60), subject to the budget constraint,
(58) and (59), with a0 given. The solution to the problem is characterized by:
_ct
ct
=
"
rt   Wt  
_Ct
1 + Ct
  + 1
u0 (ct)
0
 
at  
 
bst +m
s
t   sItKt

1 + Ct
!#
u0 (ct)
 u00 (ct) ct ; (61)
v0 (lt) =
1  Lt
1 + Ct
wtu
0 (ct) ; (62)
h0

mt
1 + Ct

= itu
0 (ct) ; (63)
together with the transversality condition:
lim
t!1
e t
u0 (ct)
1 + Ct
at = 0: (64)
The reason why _Ct appears in the Euler equation (61) is that a rising path of the con-
sumption tax makes future consumption expansive relative to current consumption. This
reduces the e¤ective real interest rate faced by consumers, which raises the demand for
consumption.
On the supply side, the constant returns to scale production function implies that, in
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equilibrium, the real rental cost of capital and the real wage are given by:
Rt
Pt
= FK (Kt; Lt) ; (65)
wt = FL (Kt; Lt) ; (66)
respectively.
The downward wage rigidity is the same as before, summarized by (36). As the
rst-best allocation is characterized by full employment, i.e. Lt = lt, it cannot be imple-
mented with ination below R. Thus, as we shall see, the rst-best allocation can be
implemented for any given path of ination such that t 2

R; 

. This requires the
money supply to grow at rate t at time t.
In the rst-best allocation, households have a zero marginal utility of real money
balances, by (51). The decentralized money demand equation (63) therefore implies that,
to implement the optimal allocation, we must have it = 0 and, hence, rt =  t.
Fundamentally, in the laissez-faire economy, the lower bound on the real interest rate,
rt   , creates two distortions that need to be corrected. First, by (8), it reduces the
demand for consumption. Second, by (16), it reduces the capital-labor ratio.
To correct the rst distortion, the net-of-tax interest rate rt   Wt   _Ct =
 
1 + Ct

=
 t   Wt   _Ct =
 
1 + Ct

in the demand for consumption (61) must be equal to the
natural real interest rate rnt . As in practice the consumption tax cannot be increasing
forever, I impose that it must be constant over time, i.e. _Ct = 0. To implement the
rst-best allocation for a given t 2

R; 

, the wealth tax must therefore be given by:
Wt =  rnt   t: (67)
This guarantees that the consumption Euler equation of the decentralized economy (61)
coincides with the corresponding rst-order condition to the planners problem (49). Sec-
ular stagnation results from the fact that in steady state rnt = r
n <  , which implies
that Wt =  rn   t >    t  0.
To correct the second distortion, the marginal product of capital of the frictionless
equilibrium FK (Kt ; l

t ) =  + r
n
t must be made consistent with real interest rate of the
decentralized economy rt =  t. Hence, by the arbitrage relationship (57), the capital
income tax Kt , the depreciation allowance 't, and the investment subsidy s
I
t must be
jointly chosen such that:
 t =
 
1  Kt

[ + rnt ] + 
K
t 't   _sIt
1  sIt
  : (68)
Let us consider three special cases of interest. For simplicity, I focus on the optimal policy
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with constant ination  2 R;  and in steady state, where rnt = rn =  . First,
relying exclusively on the investment subsidy, i.e. K = 0, we have:
sI =
 rn   
    ; (69)
which is strictly positive, as rn <      and   >   = +rn = FK (K; l) > 0.
Second, relying on the capital income tax with full depreciation allowance, i.e. sI = 0
and ' = 1, we obtain:
K =
 rn   
 rn ; (70)
which is strictly positive (to the extent that   0 implies rn < 0). In fact, the
negative natural real interest rate implies that the returns from capital in the frictionless
equilibrium are negative. Hence, with full depreciation allowance, a positive capital
income tax absorbs some of the losses from capital. It therefore subsidizes capital. Third,
relying again on the capital income tax but with no depreciation allowance, i.e. sI = 0
and ' = 0, we have:
K =
rn + 
 + rn
; (71)
which, in steady state, is negative as rn +  =   +  < 0. With no depreciation
allowance, the capital income tax needs to be negative to subsidize capital. Importantly,
these three policies are equivalent as they all implement the same marginal product of
capital rn +  = FK (K; l).
The optimality condition for labor supply (50) implies that, if both consumption and
the capital-labor ratio are at their rst-best levels, then so is the supply of labor. Hence,
by (62) and (66), the labor income and consumption taxes can both be set equal to zero,
i.e. Lt = 
C
t = 0.
Let us now determine the level of the lump-sum transfers  t that balances the in-
tertemporal government budget constraint. The accumulation of government liabilities
is given by:
_bst + _m
s
t = rt [b
s
t +m
s
t ]  itmst +  t + sIt
h
_Kt + Kt
i
  Kt [Rt=Pt   't]Kt   Wt at: (72)
Rearranging terms, this can be written as:
_bst + _m
s
t   sIt _Kt   _sItKt =
 
rt   Wt
 
bst +m
s
t   sItKt

(73)
 itmst +  t + sIt [rt + ]Kt   _sItKt   Kt [Rt=Pt   't]Kt   Wt Kt:
But, by the arbitrage relationship (57), we know that sIt [rt + ]  _sIt  Kt [Rt=Pt   't] =
rt +    Rt=Pt. As the sum of the wealth of the private and of the public sector must
be equal to the stock of physical capital, the government is always solvent, and able to
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redeem the money supply, provided that it satises the following no-Ponzi condition:35
lim
t!1
e 
R t
0(rs Ws )ds

bst +m
s
t   sItKt
  0: (74)
Hence, the governments intertemporal budget constraint is given by:
b0 +m0   sI0K0 (75)
+
Z 1
0
e 
R t
0(rx Wx )dx
 itmst +  t + (rt +   Rt=Pt)Kt   Wt Kt dt  0;
But, in the rst-best allocation, it = 0. Also, the optimal policy for a given t 2

R; 

is such that rt =  t, Rt=Pt    = rnt and Wt =  rnt   t. It immediately follows that
the government budget constraint simplies to:
b0 +m0   sI0K0 +
Z 1
0
e 
R t
0 r
n
xdx tdt  0: (76)
This shows that, if sI0 = 0, the optimal policy is self-nancing as the wealth tax pays
for the subsidization of income from physical capital. The only e¤ect of the policy is to
modify the real interest rate at which future lump-sum transfers are discounted.
The initial investment subsidy sI0 reduces the initial price of capital, which tightens
the budget constraint of households. This mechanically relaxes the government budget
constraint. Hence, sI0 acts as a levy on initial capital. However, if the natural real interest
rate rnt is eventually negative, then innitesimally small negative lump-sum transfers  t
forever are su¢ cient to balance the government budget constraint for any nite value of
sI0. In that case, the lump-sum transfers that the government can a¤ord are not a¤ected
by sI0.
Proceeding as before, cf. (41), it is straightforward to check that, under the optimal
policy, the transversality conditions of the household (64) and of the planner (52) coincide.
We have therefore characterized by construction a policy that can implement the rst-
best allocation for any path of ination such that t 2

R; 

at all time t. The main
result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 At any time T , the rst-best allocation can be implemented in the decen-
tralized economy for any given path of ination (^t)
1
t=T such that ^t 2

R; 

for all
t  T by setting the money growth rate t, the tax on wealth Wt , the capital income tax
35This is a generalization of the conservative government budget constraint, given by (22).
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Kt , the depreciation allowance 't, and the investment subsidy s
I
t such that:
t = ^t; (77)
Wt =  rnt   ^t; (78) 
1  sIt

[   ^t] =
 
1  Kt

[ + rnt ] + 
K
t 't   _sIt : (79)
This policy is revenue neutral, except that sI0 acts as a levy on initial capital.
The optimal policy implements the allocation of the frictionless equilibrium with it = 0.
However, it implements this allocation with ination t = ^t 2

R; 

, rather than the
much higher rate t =  rnt .
By construction, the optimal policy is consistent with the ination ceiling  at all
time, except possibly when the policy is implemented. Indeed, as the economy jumps
from the secular stagnation to the frictionless equilibrium, the zero lower bound ceases
to bind.36 If the policy is implemented at time T with it = 0, then the price level at T
must be given by:
PT =
MT
m
.
To prevent the price level from jumping upon implementation of the policy, the money
supply at time T must be equal to mPT ", where PT " denotes the price level that pre-
vailed just before. If the real money supply at time T   " was larger than the transaction
demand for money, i.e. mT " > m, the government must redeem a quantity mT "   m
of money. This can generate a massive increase in government debt.37 However, in the-
ory, with a permanently negative natural real interest rate, the governments no-Ponzi
condition (74) is satised for an arbitrarily large initial level of debt, provided that the
primary budget is subsequently balanced. These considerations nevertheless show that, if
the government used to rely excessively on the printing press to nance its expenditures,
then the sustainability of public debt can become an important issue when the optimal
policy is implemented.
For simplicity, let us consider that the government targets a constant rate of ination
^ 2 R;  and that, once the economy is in steady state, the policy becomes time
36Even if the nominal interest rate remains equal to zero, the zero lower bound is no longer preventing
that rate from being negative. Hence, as explained in the derivation of the steady state equilibrium, an
equilibrium where some money is used for saving is unstable.
37In my model, the government corresponds to the consolidation of the ministry of nance and of the
central bank. In practice, the central bank can redeem the money supply by selling the government
bonds that it previously acquired to nance the public decit. This does not change the indebtedness
of the ministry of nance, but raises the amount of debt held by the private sector rather than by the
central bank. In Japan, the debt-to-GDP ratio amounts to 230% of GDP, a quarter of which is held by
the central bank. Thus, the amount of debt held by the private sector only amounts to 170% of GDP. If
Japan escapes the liquidity trap, this ratio would need to increase sharply to avoid a jump in the price
level.
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invariant, i.e. t = , 
W
t = 
W , Kt = 
K , 't = ', and s
I
t = s
I . Importantly, the
optimal policy does not eliminate the secular stagnation equilibrium, where ination is
below the target ^.38 There is however one important exception.
Proposition 8 The frictionless and secular stagnation steady state equilibria can coin-
cide if and only if the optimal policy is implemented with ination target ^ = R. If the
secular stagnation equilibrium is unique, which must be the case for  su¢ ciently close
to zero, then the optimal policy with ^ = R uniquely implements the rst-best allocation.
Implementing the optimal allocation with ination target ^ = R requires the most
aggressive policy intervention, i.e. the largest wealth tax and the highest subsidization
of physical capital. Indeed, a massive intervention is necessary to make the optimal
allocation consistent with an ination rate as low as R.
If the government would like to be in the optimal allocation with ination , then
it should rst implement the optimal policy with ^ = R in order to escape secular
stagnation. It should then raise the growth rate of the money supply to , while reducing
the size of the wealth tax, and of the subsidization of capital that it nances, until the
nominal interest rate is back to zero.
The wealth of households is composed of physical capital, bonds, and money. A
potential concern with the optimal policy is that money might be harder to tax than
physical capital or bonds. Households might indeed be tempted to accumulate stockpiles
of cash to avoid paying the wealth tax. But, untaxed money yields a real interest rate
 t, which, under the ination ceiling, is higher than the steady state natural real interest
rate. By arbitrage, this would induce the after-tax real interest rate on physical capital
and on bonds to be above the natural rate, which would prevent the implementation of
the optimal allocation. It is therefore essential that the government is able to tax money.
To ght against money laundering, many countries already enforce signicant restric-
tions that reduce the value of large sums of undeclared currency. There are limits to the
size of payments than can be made in cash.39 Banks cannot accept large cash deposits if
the origin of the funds is not proven. Controls can also be made when old bills occasion-
ally become obsolete and are replaced by new ones. If these measures are not su¢ cient,
then the government can adopt a payment system that exclusively relies on electronic
money.
Note that, if money is straightforward to tax, then an alternative way to implement
the rst-best allocation is to alleviate the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate.
For this, a government targeting ination ^t only needs to tax money at rate Wt , while
38Note that, the optimal policy is revenue neutral even if it fails to implement the optimal allocation.
39In France, the limit is 1 000 euros for commercial transactions and 10 000 euros for real estate
transactions.
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setting the money growth rate t and the tax rate on money 
W
t according to (77) and
(78), respectively. The lower bound on the nominal interest rate becomes  Wt , which is
negative. In that case, when the nominal rate is at its lower bound, the real interest rate
is at its natural level, as it =  Wt = rnt + ^t implies rt = it   ^t = rnt . This policy is
revenue neutral.
In the absence of electronic money, the tax on wealth seems to o¤er a more reliable
way to reduce the net-of-tax real interest rate faced by households than the tax on
money. Indeed, the wealth tax is e¤ective provided that the authorities can prevent large
accumulations of undeclared currency. By contrast, if real money balances are small
and the tax on money is poorly enforced on small amounts, then it is not clear that,
by arbitrage, it can reduce the net-of-tax real interest rate faced by households on their
holdings of physical capital and bonds. This suggests that, without electronic money, it
is likely to be very di¢ cult to enforce negative nominal interest rates.
6 Heterogeneity
For simplicity, I have so far relied on a representative household model. However, my
results only require a strictly positive mass of households to have a preference for wealth.
Indeed, in the presence of heterogeneity, impatient households borrow from those who are
more patient, until they reach their borrowing limit. Once this limit is reached, the real
interest rate must be su¢ ciently low to induce the most patient households to consume
enough to allow the economy to produce at full capacity. In other words, in steady state,
the natural real interest rate must be determined by the behavior of the most patient
households, i.e. by those who have a preference for wealth.
Under a dynastic interpretation of the innitely lived households, the borrowing limit
should be determined by the impossibility of bequeathing negative wealth. For instance,
in a discrete time model where one period corresponds to one generation, households
face a zero debt limit. As the borrowing limit must eventually be binding, I consider a
very simple form of heterogeneity whereby a fraction of households have a preference for
wealth, while the remaining fraction consists of hand-to-mouth consumers who do not
derive any utility from holding wealth.
Interestingly, in this setup, if the real interest rate is excessively high, then the econ-
omy can only produce at full capacity if poor households accumulate an excessive amount
of debt. But, once the rich lenders realize that debt cannot be passed on to the next
generation of poor households, the economy has to go through a painful deleveraging
episode. As pointed out by Summers (2014), the fact that the credit boom that occurred
before the Great Recession did not overheat the U.S. economy is fully consistent with the
secular stagnation hypothesis.
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In the presence of heterogeneity, the government might want to redistribute resources
across households. In general, as in Correia, Farhi, Nicolini and Teles (2013), the set of
implementable allocation is not modied by the zero lower bound. Indeed, the government
can always implement its desired redistribution policy, while using wealth taxes and
investment subsidies as described in the previous section to overcome the zero lower
bound.40
In the context of secular stagnation, there is however one important exception where
the zero lower bound can allow the government to implement an allocation that would
not otherwise be feasible. This occurs when the government would like to redistribute
to hand-to-mouth households, but cannot rely on household-specic lump-sum taxes or
subsidies and does not want to modify the tax rate on wealth, as this would distort the
consumption behavior of wealthy households.41 Hence, the government can only raise the
consumption of the hand-to-mouth by giving a lump-sum subsidy  t to all households.
If  t is large, this clearly violates the conservative government budget constraint, given
by:
b0 +m0 +
Z 1
0
e 
R t
0 rxdx [ t   itmt] dt  0: (80)
But, if the government does not need to redeem the outstanding money supply, the budget
constraint becomes:
b0 +
Z 1
0
e 
R t
0 rxdx [ t   tmt] dt  0: (81)
The subsidy can be nanced by printing money forever. The wealth of rich households
must therefore grow without bounds. Indeed, if the conservative version of the govern-
ments no-Ponzi condition is violated and if markets clear, then, by Walras law, the
no-Ponzi condition of rich households must be slack, for any value of the real interest
rate. The increase in wealth is not distortionary, i.e. it does not a¤ect the behavior of
rich households, provided that it does not change their marginal utility of wealth. This
either occurs if they consider money as a government liability, or if they have a constant
marginal utility of wealth.
Thus, in the absence of household specic lump-sum taxes, the only way to redistribute
to the poor without increasing the tax rate on wealth is to print money. This policy can be
sustained forever provided that the wealthy have a zero marginal propensity to consume
out of extra money supplied.42 Paradoxically, this egalitarian allocation of consumption
can only be implemented by making the rich innitely wealthy.
40Under secular stagnation, it might be tempting to stimulate aggregate demand by taxing the wealthy
and giving lump-sum subsidies to hand-to-mouth households. However, if this is not optimal in the
absence of the zero lower bound, then it remains suboptimal with it.
41Given the limited amount of heterogeneity in the model, a non-linear wealth tax could act as a
lump-sum tax. I therefore assume that this instrument is not available.
42This assumption does not seem outrageous in light of the recent Japanese experience, where a 230%
debt-to-GDP ratio fails to lift the economy out of secular stagnation.
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This theoretical possibility is specic to secular stagnation where the zero lower bound
is potentially binding forever. Needless to emphasize that such policy is very dangerous
should the economy ever escape secular stagnation. Hence, crucially, the increase in the
consumption of the hand-to-mouth should not induce the economy to produce at full
capacity, as ination would then explode.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I have relied on a Ramsey model with money to o¤er a simple theory of
secular stagnation. The permanent failure of the economy to produce at full capacity
results from three plausible assumptions: (i) the central bank has a low ination ceiling;
(ii) a positive mass of households has a very high propensity to save, due to a preference
for wealth; (iii) wages are downward rigid. Despite the simplicity of this theory, I was
able to derive the main Keynesian paradoxes.
I have argued that traditional monetary and scal policies are not e¢ cient in the
context of a permanent liquidity trap. To escape secular stagnation without raising the
ination ceiling, the government should instead simultaneously tax wealth and subsidize
income from physical capital, either through an investment subsidy or a reduction in the
taxation of corporate income. This policy is revenue neutral and implements the rst-best
allocation of resources.
When the economy escapes the liquidity trap, households cease to rely on money
for saving. To prevent the price level from jumping upon implementation of the opti-
mal policy, the government must therefore shrink the money supply to the level of the
transaction demand for money. This can signicantly raise the debt-to-GDP ratio. In
theory, an arbitrarily large amount of public debt is sustainable when the real interest
rate is negative forever. But, in practice, a country that used to heavily rely on monetary
nancing of public decits might be reluctant to implement the optimal policy. Hence,
an excessive reliance on the printing press can eventually result in a country choosing to
remain permanently trapped into secular stagnation.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
Let k = K=L and f (k) = F (k; 1). This implies that FK (K;L) = f 0 (k) and FL (K;L) =
f (k)  kf 0 (k). Note that f (0)  0f 0 (0) = FL (0; L) = 0 as F (0; L) = 0 for any value of
L.
In a frictionless equilibrium with    > R, the labor market must clear, i.e. L = l.
The goods market clearing condition (24) implies that:
l [f (k)  k] = c: (A1)
By (9) and (15), we have:
v0 (l) = [f (k)  kf 0 (k)]u0 (c) : (A2)
Finally, by (8) with _ct = 0 and at   (bt +mt) = K = kl and by (16), we have:
u0 (c) =
0 (kl)
  [f 0 (k)  ] . (A3)
42
These three equations jointly characterize the steady state frictionless equilibrium.
Let k^ be uniquely dened by f(k^) = k^. Substituting (A1) into (A2) yields:
v0

c
f (k)  k

= [f (k)  kf 0 (k)]u0 (c) : (A4)
For any given value of k 2 (0; k^), as c increases from 0 to+1, the right hand side decreases
from +1 to 0 while the left hand side is increasing and non-negative. Hence, for any
value of k 2 (0; k^), there is a unique corresponding value of c. Moreover, di¤erentiating
(A4) with respect to k reveals that c is a continuous function of k for k 2 (0; k^). Also, in
the limit as k tends to k^, c must tend to 0.43
Let ~k be uniquely dened by  = f 0(~k)   . Clearly, f 0(k^)    < 0 <  = f 0(~k)   .
Hence, ~k < k^. Substituting (A1) into (A3) yields:
0

kc
f (k)  k

= [+    f 0 (k)]u0 (c) : (A5)
Note that k= [f (k)  k] is an increasing function of k.44 Let c be dened by [ +   
f 0(k^)]u0 (c) = limK!+1 0 (K). Thus, as k tends to k^ from below, c tends to c.45 For
any given value of c 2 (0; c), as k increases from ~k to k^, the right hand side of (A5)
increases from 0 to [ +    f 0(k^)]u0 (c) > [ +    f 0(k^)]u0 (c) while the left hand side
is weakly decreasing and tends to limK!+1 0 (K) = [ +    f 0(k^)]u0 (c) as k tends to
k^. Hence, for any value of c 2 (0; c), there is a unique corresponding value of k 2 (~k; k^).
Moreover, di¤erentiating (A5) with respect to c reveals that k is a continuous function
of c for c 2 (0; c).
The steady state frictionless equilibrium is fully characterized by (A4) and (A5). But,
by (A4), c is a continuous function of k for k 2 (0; k^), which tends to 0 as k tends to k^;
while, by (A5), k is a continuous function of c for c 2 (0; c) with k 2 (~k; k^). Hence, there
exists at least one value of k 2 (~k; k^) that corresponds to a frictionless equilibrium.
If  = 0, then we have f 0(~k)   = 0. If labor supply is inelastic, then, by (A1), c is a
strictly decreasing function of k for all k 2 (~k; k^), while, by (A3), c is a strictly increasing
function of k for all k 2 (~k; k^). Hence, the equilibrium value of k 2 (~k; k^) must be unique.
By continuity, the results also holds provided that  is su¢ ciently small and that labor
supply is su¢ ciently inelastic.
43If the maximum feasible labor supply l is nite, then, by (A1), c must tend to 0 while, by (A2), l
must tend to l, as liml!l v0 (l) =1. If l is innite, then c cannot tend to a strictly positive value, as, by
(A2), l would also tend to a nite value which would be inconsistent with (A1). Hence, c must tend to
0 while l must tend to 1.
44Its derivative is equal to [f (k)  kf 0 (k)] = [f (k)  k]2, which is positive as f (k)   kf 0 (k) =
FL (K;L).
45Note that c cannot tend to 0 as limK!0 0 (K) <1.
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B Proof of Lemma 2
As in the proof of the previous lemma, let k = K=L and f (k) = F (k; 1). To prove
the lemma, we compare the slope of the aggregate demand and of the aggregate supply
curves. For this, we rst need to compute the derivative of c, k, and l with respect to r,
where r = i   with i  0. Recall that, when  2 R; , the labor market clears, i.e.
L = l.
From the equation for the demand for capital (16), we have:
dk
dr
=
1
f 00 (k)
< 0:
Implicitly di¤erentiating the optimality condition for labor supply (9) with w = f (k) 
kf 0 (k) yields:
dl
dr
=
1
v00 (l)

 kf 00 (k)u0 (c) dk
dr
+ wu00 (c)
dc
dr

;
=
1
v00 (l)

 ku0 (c) + wu00 (c) dc
dr

:
Finally, from the optimality condition for consumption (8) with _ct = 0 and at (bt +mt) =
K = kl, we have:
dc
dr
=
1
u00 (c)

0 (kl)
(  r)2 +
00 (kl)
  r

l
dk
dr
+ k
dl
dr

;
=
u0 (c)
u00 (c)

u0 (c)
0 (kl)
+
00 (kl)
0 (kl)

l
f 00 (k)
+
k
v00 (l)

 ku0 (c) + wu00 (c) dc
dr

;
=
u0 (c)
u00 (c)

u0 (c)
0 (kl)
  kl
00 (kl)
0 (kl)

ku0 (c)
lv00 (l)
  1
kf 00 (k)

+
kl00 (kl)
0 (kl)
v0 (l)
lv00 (l)
dc
dr
:
where I have used the fact that    r = 0 (kl) =u0 (c) to derive the second line and that
wu0 (c) = v0 (l) to derive the third line. Rearranging terms, this expression can be written
as:
dc
dr
=
 1
lv00(l)
v0(l) +
 kl00(kl)
0(kl)
lv00 (l)
v0 (l)
u0 (c)
 u00 (c)

u0 (c)
0 (kl)
+
 kl00 (kl)
0 (kl)

ku0 (c)
lv00 (l)
+
1
 kf 00 (k)

;
which shows that consumption is unambiguously decreasing in the real interest rate.
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Substituting this expression into the derivative of labor supply yields:
dl
dr
=
 ku0 (c)
v00 (l)
+
l
lv00(l)
v0(l) +
 kl00(kl)
0(kl)

u0 (c)
0 (kl)
+
 kl00 (kl)
0 (kl)

ku0 (c)
lv00 (l)
+
1
 kf 00 (k)

;
=
l
lv00(l)
v0(l) +
 kl00(kl)
0(kl)

u0 (c)
0 (kl)
  lv
00 (l)
v0 (l)
ku0 (c)
lv00 (l)
+
 kl00 (kl)
0 (kl)
1
 kf 00 (k)

;
=
1
lv00(l)
v0(l) +
 kl00(kl)
0(kl)

lu0 (c)
0 (kl)

1  k
0 (kl)
v0 (l)

+
 kl00 (kl)
0 (kl)
l
 kf 00 (k)

:
But, as 0 (kl) = (  r)u0 (c) = (  f 0 (k) + )u0 (c) and v0 (l) = wu0 (c), we have:
dl
dr
=
1
lv00(l)
v0(l) +
 kl00(kl)
0(kl)

lu0 (c)
0 (kl)

1  k (  f
0 (k) + )
w

+
 kl00 (kl)
0 (kl)
l
 kf 00 (k)

;
=
1
lv00(l)
v0(l) +
 kl00(kl)
0(kl)

lu0 (c)
0 (kl)
f (k)  k (+ )
w
+
 kl00 (kl)
0 (kl)
l
 kf 00 (k)

;
where I have used the fact that w = f (k) kf 0 (k). Clearly, if labor supply is su¢ ciently
inelastic, then dl=dr can be arbitrarily close to zero.
Let ys and yd denote the aggregate supply and the aggregate demand, respectively.
We have ys = F (K;L) = F (k; 1)L = f (k) l, since L = l, and yd = c + K = c + kl.
We can now compare the slopes of the aggregate demand and supply curves:
d
 
ys   yd
dr
=
d ([f (k)  k] l   c)
dr
;
= [f (k)  k] dl
dr
+ [f 0 (k)  ] l dk
dr
  dc
dr
;
= [f (k)  k] dl
dr
+
rl
f 00 (k)
  dc
dr
: (B1)
where, to get the third line, I have used the fact that f 0 (k)    = r. If labor supply is
inelastic, i.e. dl=dr = 0, we have:
d
 
ys   yd
dr
=
rl
f 00 (k)
  dc
dr
 l
f 00 (k)
  dc
dr
;
where I have used the fact that   r = 0 (kl) =u0 (c)  0. Hence, if  = 0:
d
 
ys   yd
dr
  dc
dr
> 0;
or, equivalently:
dys
dr
>
dyd
dr
:
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But, recall that we have r = i    > 0    = rn and that ys = yd when r = rn. The
inequality therefore implies that yd is strictly smaller than ys for all r > rn. By continuity,
this must be true provided that  is su¢ ciently close to zero and that labor supply is
su¢ ciently inelastic.
Even if labor supply is very elastic, the rst term of (B1) is positive under mild
conditions, which strengthens the above result. More formally, we have:
[f (k)  k] dl
dr
=
ys   yd + c
l
1
lv00(l)
v0(l)   kl
00(kl)
0(kl)

ys   yd + c  kl
(+ )w
+
l
kf 00 (k)
kl00 (kl)
0 (kl)

:
where I have used the fact that ys   yd = [f (k)  k] l   c. If c > K for all r 2 [rn; ],
then this expression is positive for r = rn, since ys = yd when r = rn. This implies that
dys=dr > dyd=dr for r = rn. By induction, as r increases from rn to , we have yd < ys,
[f (k)  k] dl=dr > 0, and dys=dr > dyd=dr for all r 2 [rn; ].
C Proof of Lemma 3
As in the proof of the previous two lemmas, let k = K=L and f (k) = F (k; 1). By (8), (9),
  = f 0 (k) , w = f (k) kf 0 (k), and (36), we know that c, l, k, w, and L are continuous
functions of r =   for  2  R   ; .46 Hence, aggregate demand yd = c + kL and
aggregate supply ys = Lf (k) are continuous functions of  for  2  R   ; . By
assumption, yd < ys for  = R. Thus, to prove the existence of an equilibrium, it is
su¢ cient to show that, in the limit as  tends to R   , we have yd > ys.
Let ~f (k) = f (k)  kf 0 (k). We know that, for any K and L, FL (K;L) = f (K=L) 
K=Lf 0 (K=L) = ~f (K=L). We also have F (0; L) = 0 for any L, which implies that
FL (0; L) = 0. Thus, FL (0; L) = ~f (0=L) = ~f (0) = 0. We also have ~f 0 (k) =  kf 00 (k),
which shows that ~f (k) is strictly increasing for any k > 0. Hence, the unique solution to
~f (k) = 0 for k  0 is k = 0.
To ensure that the demand for consumption, given by (8), is strictly positive when
 = R   , we need to have +  = + R    > 0 or, equivalently,  < R + . This
in fact guarantees that consumption is positive for all  2  R   ; R. Thus, by (8),
  = f 0 (k)   , w = f (k)   kf 0 (k), and (9), the values of c, k, w, and l are strictly
positive and nite when  = R . The remaining variable, L, is implicitly determined
46Recall that, by footnote 12,  < . This guarantees that   = f 0 (k)    denes k as a continuous
function of  for all  2  R   ; . Also, note that the consumers problem implies that we have a
corner solution with c = 0 and v0 (l) = +1 whenever    . However, this case does not arise when
 < R +  since  > R    >  .
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by (36), which can be written as:
w =

   (R   )FL (K; l) ;
=

   (R   )
~f

K
l

;
=

   (R   )
~f

L
l
k

:
But, as  tends to R , the rst term of the product tends to innity while w tends to
a strictly positive and nite value. Hence, ~f (kL=l) must tend to zero while k and l also
tend to strictly positive and nite values. Thus, labor demand L must tend to zero as 
tends to R   . But, if L tends to zero while k and c tend to strictly positive and nite
values, then ys = Lf (k) must tend to zero while yd = c + kL tends to c > 0. Thus, in
the limit, we unambiguously have yd > ys.
As  tends to zero, R    tends to R. Thus, c, k, w, and l for  2  R   ; R
converge to strictly positive and nite values (since  does not show up in (8),   =
f 0 (k)   , w = f (k)   kf 0 (k), or (9) while  converges to R). There is therefore a
unique value of L that can equate aggregate supply ys = Lf (k) to demand yd = c+ kL.
But, for any  > 0 and  2  R   ; R, L is implicitly given by:
w =

   (R   )
~f

L
l
k

:
Thus, the unique value L that equates ys and yd determines a unique value of the ra-
tio =

    R   . Hence, for any  strictly positive but arbitrarily small, there
is a unique corresponding rate of ination  2  R   ; R that is consistent with an
equilibrium.
D Lemma 4
As in the proof of Lemma 3, let k = K=L, f (k) = F (k; 1), and ~f (k) = f (k)   kf 0 (k).
In a secular stagnation steady state with an exogenous real interest rate r, we must have
u0 (c) = 0 (kL) = (  r), by (8), r = f 0 (k)  , by (16), and L [f (k)  k] = c, by (24).47
47The real interest rate does not directly a¤ect the other equations that characterize the secular
stagnation steady state.
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Totally di¤erentiating these last two equations with respect to r yields:
dk
dr
=
1
f 00 (k)
;
dL
dr
=
1
f (k)  k
dc
dr
  L f
0 (k)  
f (k)  k
dk
dr
;
respectively. It follows that:
k
dL
dr
+ L
dk
dr
=
k
f (k)  k
dc
dr
  Lk f
0 (k)  
f (k)  k
dk
dr
+ L
dk
dr
;
=
k
f (k)  k
dc
dr
+ L
f (k)  kf 0 (k)
f (k)  k
dk
dr
;
=
kL
c
dc
dr
+
L2
c
~f (k)
f 00 (k)
;
where I have used the fact that f (k)   k = c=L. Totally di¤erentiating u0 (c) =
0 (kL) = (  r) yields:
dc
dr
=
1
u00 (c)

0 (kL)
(  r)2 +
00 (kL)
  r

k
dL
dr
+ L
dk
dr

;
=
0 (kL)
u00 (c) (  r)
"
u0 (c)
0 (kL)
+
00 (kL)
0 (kL)
"
kL
c
dc
dr
+
L2
c
~f (k)
f 00 (k)
##
;
=
u0 (c)
cu00 (c)
"
cu0 (c)
0 (kL)
+
kL00 (kL)
0 (kL)
L ~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
#
+
u0 (c)
cu00 (c)
kL00 (kL)
0 (kL)
dc
dr
;
where I have used the fact that 0 (kL) = (  r) = u0 (c). It follows that:
dc
dr
=
1
"   "u
"
cu0 (c)
0 (kL)
  " L
~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
#
;
where " =  kL00 (kL) =0 (kL) and "u =  cu00 (c) =u0 (c). Thus, dc=dr < 0 if and only
if " < "u.
We therefore have:
k
dL
d
+ L
dk
d
=
kL
c
"
dc
dr
+
L
k
~f (k)
f 00 (k)
#
;
=
kL
c
1
"   "u
"
cu0 (c)
0 (kL)
  " L
~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
+ ("   "u) L
k
~f (k)
f 00 (k)
#
;
=
kL
c
1
"   "u
"
cu0 (c)
0 (kL)
  "uL
k
~f (k)
f 00 (k)
#
:
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Output is given by y = c+ kL, which implies that:
dy
dr
=
dc
dr
+ 

k
dL
dr
+ L
dk
dr

;
=
1
"   "u
"
cu0 (c)
0 (kL)
  " L
~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
+
kL
c
"
cu0 (c)
0 (kL)
  "uL
k
~f (k)
f 00 (k)
##
;
=
1
"u   "
"
c+ kL
c
cu0 (c)
0 (kL)
 

" +
kL
c
"u

L ~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
#
:
Hence, dy=dr < 0 if and only if " < "u.
E Proofs of Proposition 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5
As in the proof of Lemma 3, let k = K=L, f (k) = F (k; 1), and ~f (k) = f (k)   kf 0 (k).
We know that ~f (0) = 0, that ~f 0 (k) =  kf 00 (k) > 0 for any k > 0, and that, for any K
and L, FL (K;L) = f (K=L)   K=Lf 0 (K=L) = ~f (K=L). Combining (15) and (36), we
therefore have:
FL (K;L) =

   (R   )FL (K; l) ;
~f

K
L

=

   (R   )
~f

K
l

;

    R    ~f (k) =  ~f L
l
k

:
We also know, by (15), that w = ~f (k). The secular stagnation equilibrium (c; k; ; l; L; y)
is therefore fully characterized by:
u0 (c) =
0 (kL)
+ 
; (E1)
  = f 0 (k)  ; (E2)
    R    ~f (k) =  ~f L
l
k

; (E3)
%v0 (l) =  ~f (k)u0 (c) ; (E4)
Lf (k) = c+ kL+ g; (E5)
y = c+ kL+ g; (E6)
where I have added three new parameters, , %, and , that stand for the marginal
utility of wealth, for the disutility of supplying labor, and for total factor productivity,
respectively. To prove the propositions, we need to totally di¤erentiate these equations
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with respect to , , %, , and g. I set  = 1, except in the proof of Proposition 2,
% =  = 1, except in the proof of Proposition 3, and g = 0, except in the proof of the
Proposition 4 and 5.
Finally, throughout the proofs, I will use the notations "u =  cu00 (c) =u0 (c) and
" =  K00 (K) =0 (K).
E.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Totally di¤erentiating (E2) and (E5) with respect to  yields:
dk
d
=
1
 f 00 (k)
d
d
;
dL
d
=
1
f (k)  k
dc
d
  L f
0 (k)  
f (k)  k
dk
d
;
respectively. It follows that:
k
dL
d
+ L
dk
d
=
k
f (k)  k
dc
d
  Lk f
0 (k)  
f (k)  k
dk
d
+ L
dk
d
;
=
k
f (k)  k
dc
d
+ L
f (k)  kf 0 (k)
f (k)  k
dk
d
;
=
kL
c
dc
d
  L
2
c
~f (k)
f 00 (k)
d
d
;
where I have used the fact that f (k)  k = c=L. Totally di¤erentiating (E1) yields:
dc
d
=
1
u00 (c)
 0 (kL)
(+ )2
d
d
+
00 (kL)
+ 

k
dL
d
+ L
dk
d

;
=
0 (kL)
u00 (c) (+ )
"
 u0 (c)
0 (kL)
d
d
+
00 (kL)
0 (kL)
"
kL
c
dc
d
  L
2
c
~f (k)
f 00 (k)
d
d
##
;
=
 u0 (c)
cu00 (c)
"
cu0 (c)
0 (kL)
+
kL00 (kL)
0 (kL)
L ~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
#
d
d
+
u0 (c)
cu00 (c)
kL00 (kL)
0 (kL)
dc
d
;
where I have used the fact that 0 (kL) = (+ ) = u0 (c). It follows that:
dc
d
=
1
"u   "
"
cu0 (c)
0 (kL)
  " L
~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
#
d
d
;
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where "u =  cu00 (c) =u0 (c) and " =  kL00 (kL) =0 (kL). Hence:
k
dL
d
+ L
dk
d
=
kL
c
"
dc
d
  L
k
~f (k)
f 00 (k)
d
d
#
;
=
kL
c
1
"u   "
"
cu0 (c)
0 (kL)
  " L
~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
  ("u   ") L
k
~f (k)
f 00 (k)
#
d
d
;
=
kL
c
1
"u   "
"
cu0 (c)
0 (kL)
  "uL
k
~f (k)
f 00 (k)
#
d
d
:
Di¤erentiating (E6) with respect to  gives:
dy
d
=
dc
d
+ 

k
dL
d
+ L
dk
d

;
=
1
"u   "
"
cu0 (c)
0 (kL)
  " L
~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
+
kL
c
"
cu0 (c)
0 (kL)
  "uL
k
~f (k)
f 00 (k)
##
d
d
;
=
1
"u   "
"
c+ kL
c
cu0 (c)
0 (kL)
 

" +
kL
c
"u

L ~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
#
d
d
:
If "u  " > 0, then the term in the main square bracket is strictly positive. In that case,
a fall in ination results in a lower output level.
Totally di¤erentiating (E3) with respect to  yields:
~f (k)+ ~f (k)
d
d
+

    R    ~f 0 (k) dk
d
= ~f

L
l
k

+ ~f 0

L
l
k

L
l
dk
d
+
k
l
dL
d
  Lk
l2
dl
d

;
where dl=d can be computed from (E4). We know that, in the secular stagnation
equilibrium,  2  R   ; R. Hence, as  tends to zero,     R    also tends to
zero. It follows that, as  tends to zero, the above expression simplies to:
d
d
=
~f
 
L
l
k
  ~f (k)
~f (k)
:
But, L < l and ~f () is a strictly increasing function.48 Hence, d=d < 0. By continuity,
this result remains true if  is su¢ ciently close to zero.
48In the limit as  tends to zero, we know that L < l. Indeed, when  = R, we know by Lemma 2
that ys = lf (k) > c+ kl = yd. If  2  R   ; R, then, in the limit as  tends to zero, c, l, or k are
not a¤ected by the fact that  < R (and we still have lf (k) > c+ kl), while in the secular stagnation
equilibrium L is such that Lf (k) = c+ kL. Combining these two equations immediately yields l > L.
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E.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Di¤erentiating (E3) with respect to  gives:
~f (k)
d
d
+

    R    ~f 0 (k) dk
d
=

l
~f 0

L
l
k

L
dk
d
+ k
dL
d
  Lk
l
dl
d

:
But, given that in the secular stagnation equilibrium  2  R   ; R, we know that
    R    tends to zero as  tends to zero. Also, dc=d, dk=d, dl=d, and dL=d,
which can be derived from (E1), (E2), (E4), and (E5), respectively, are only a¤ected by
 through d=d. Hence, as  tends to zero, d=d also tends to zero.
Relying on (E2) and (E5), where  does not appear, and proceeding as in the proof
of Proposition 1, we obtain:
k
dL
d
+ L
dk
d
=
kL
c
dc
d
  L
2
c
~f (k)
f 00 (k)
d
d
:
Di¤erentiating (E1) with respect to  gives:
dc
d
=
1
u00 (c)

0 (kL)
+ 
  
0 (kL)
(+ )2
d
d
+
00 (kL)
+ 

k
dL
d
+ L
dk
d

;
=
1
cu00 (c)
0 (kL)
+ 
"
c

+
 
"
L ~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
  c
+ 
!
d
d
  " dc
d
#
;
=
 1
"u
"
c

+
 
"
L ~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
  cu
0 (c)
0 (kL)
!
d
d
#
+
"
"u
dc
d
:
where, as before, "u =  cu00 (c) =u0 (c) and " =  kL00 (kL) =0 (kL). It follows that:
dc
d
=
 1
"u   "
"
c

+
 
"
L ~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
  cu
0 (c)
0 (kL)
!
d
d
#
:
Hence:
d (kL)
d
= 
kL
c
dc
d
  L
2
c
~f (k)
f 00 (k)
d
d
;
=
 1
"u   "
"
kL

+
 
"
L2
c
~f (k)
f 00 (k)
  kLu
0 (c)
0 (kL)
+ ("u   ") L
2
c
~f (k)
f 00 (k)
!
d
d
#
;
=
 1
"u   "
"
kL

+
 
"u
L2
c
~f (k)
f 00 (k)
  kLu
0 (c)
0 (kL)
!
d
d
#
:
Recall that d=d tends to zero as  tends to zero.49 It unambiguously follows that
49Using the above expressions, it is possible to show that for  strictly positive, but su¢ ciently small,
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dc=d < 0 and d (kL) =d < 0, provided that "u > ".
E.3 Proof of Proposition 3
I rst focus on the impact of the disutility of labor % while setting  = 1; I then focus on
the impact of total factor productivity  while setting % = 1.
E.3.1 Disutility of Labor
Relying on (E1), (E2), and (E5), where % does not appear, and proceeding as in the proof
of Proposition 1, we obtain:
dk
d
=
1
 f 00 (k)
d
d%
;
dc
d%
=
1
"u   "
"
cu0 (c)
0 (kL)
  " L
~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
#
d
d%
;
k
dL
d%
+ L
dk
d%
=
kL
c
1
"u   "
"
cu0 (c)
0 (kL)
  "uL
k
~f (k)
f 00 (k)
#
d
d%
:
If "u > " and if a rise in the disutility of labor is inationary, then, by the second
expression, it must increase consumption c while, by the third expression, it must raise
investment kL. Totally di¤erentiating (E4) with respect to % yields:
dl
d%
=
1
%v00 (l)

 v0 (l)  kf 00 (k)u0 (c) dk
d%
+ ~f (k)u00 (c)
dc
d%

;
=
 v0 (l)
%v00 (l)
+
1
%v00 (l)
"
ku0 (c) +
~f (k)u00 (c)
"u   "
 
cu0 (c)
0 (kL)
  " L
~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
!#
d
d%
:
Di¤erentiating (E3), we have:
~f (k)
d
d%
      R    kf 00 (k) dk
d%
=

l
~f 0

L
l
k

L
dk
d%
+ k
dL
d%
  kL
l
dl
d%

:
Substituting the above expressions into this equation gives:
~f (k)
d
d%
+

    R    kd
d%
=  ~f 0

L
l
k

kL
l2
v0 (l)
%v00 (l)
+

l
~f 0

L
l
k

[:::]
d
d%
:
As  tends to zero,     R    also tends to zero. Thus, solving for d=d% shows that
it tends to:
1
~f (k)
 ~f 0

L
l
k

kL
l2
v0 (l)
%v00 (l)
,
d=d < 0, which amplies the fall in consumption and in investment.
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which is strictly positive provided that  > 0.50 Thus, for  su¢ ciently small but strictly
positive, we have d=d% > 0. It follows that a rise in the disutility of labor increases
ination, consumption, investment, and, hence, output.
E.3.2 Total Factor Productivity
Totally di¤erentiating (E2) and (E5) with respect to  yields:
dk
d
=
 f 0 (k)
f 00 (k)
  1
f 00 (k)
d
d
;
dL
d
=
1
f (k)  k

 Lf (k) + dc
d
  L [f 0 (k)  ] dk
d

;
=
 L2f (k)
c
+
L2
c
f 0 (k) [f 0 (k)  ]
f 00 (k)
+
L
c
dc
d
+
L2
c
[f 0 (k)  ]
f 00 (k)
d
d
:
It follows that:
k
dL
d
+ L
dk
d
=
 kL2
c
f (k) +
kL2
c
f 0 (k) [f 0 (k)  ]
f 00 (k)
  Lf
0 (k)
f 00 (k)
+
kL
c
dc
d
+

kL2
c
[f 0 (k)  ]
f 00 (k)
  L
f 00 (k)

d
d
;
=
 kL2
c
f (k) +
L2
c
f 0 (k)
f 00 (k)
[k [f 0 (k)  ]  [f (k)  k]] + kL
c
dc
d
+
L2
c
1
f 00 (k)
[k [f 0 (k)  ]  [f (k)  k]] d
d
;
=
 L2
c

kf (k) +
f 0 (k)
f 00 (k)
~f (k)

+
kL
c
dc
d
  L
2
c
~f (k)
f 00 (k)
d
d
:
With a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function, we have f (k) = k& for some & 2
[0; 1]. This implies that kf (k) f 00 (k)+ f 0 (k) ~f (k) = 0. Hence, proceeding as in the proof
of Proposition 1, we obtain:
dc
d
=
1
"u   "
"
cu0 (c)
0 (kL)
  " L
~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
#
d
d
;
k
dL
d
+ L
dk
d
=
kL
c
1
"u   "
"
cu0 (c)
0 (kL)
  "uL
k
~f (k)
f 00 (k)
#
d
d
:
50When  = 0, nominal wages are completely rigid and always rise at rate R. Hence, ination is
always equal to R and cannot be a¤ected by anything.
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This shows that, if "u > " and if a rise in total factor productivity is deationary, then
it must reduce both consumption c and investment kL. Di¤erentiating (E4), we have:
dl
d
=
1
v00 (l)

~f (k)u0 (c)  kf 00 (k)u0 (c) dk
d
+  ~f (k)u00 (c)
dc
d

;
=
~f (k)u0 (c)
v00 (l)
+
kf 0 (k)u0 (c)
v00 (l)
+
1
v00 (l)
"
ku0 (c) +
 ~f (k)u00 (c)
"u   "
"
cu0 (c)
0 (kL)
  " L
~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
##
d
d
;
=
f (k)u0 (c)
v00 (l)
+
1
v00 (l)
"
ku0 (c) +
 ~f (k)u00 (c)
"u   "
"
cu0 (c)
0 (kL)
  " L
~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
##
d
d
:
Totally di¤erentiating (E3) yields:
~f (k)
d
d
      R    kf 00 (k) dk
d
=

l
~f 0

L
l
k

L
dk
d
+ k
dL
d
  kL
l
dl
d

:
Substituting the above expressions into this equation gives:
~f (k)
d
d
+

    R    k

d
d
+

    R    kf 0 (k)

=   ~f 0

L
l
k

Lk
l2
f (k)u0 (c)
v00 (l)
+

l
~f 0

L
l
k

[:::]
d
d
:
As  tends to zero,     R    also tends to zero. Thus, solving for d=d shows that
it tends to:
 1
~f (k)

 ~f 0

L
l
k

Lk
l2
f (k)u0 (c)
v00 (l)
+

    R    kf 0 (k)


;
which is strictly negative provided that  > 0. Thus, for  su¢ ciently small but strictly
positive, we have d=d < 0. It follows that a rise in total factor productivity reduces
ination, consumption, investment, and, hence, output.
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E.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Totally di¤erentiating (E2) and (E5) with respect to g yields:
dk
dg
=
1
 f 00 (k)
d
dg
;
dL
dg
=
1
f (k)  k

1 +
dc
dg
  L [f 0 (k)  ] dk
dg

;
=
L
c+ g

1 +
dc
dg
+ L
f 0 (k)  
f 00 (k)
d
dg

:
It follows that:
k
dL
dg
+ L
dk
dg
=
kL
c+ g
+
kL
c+ g
dc
dg
+
  L
f 00 (k)
+
kL2 [f 0 (k)  ]
(c+ g) f 00 (k)

d
dg
;
=
kL
c+ g
+
kL
c+ g
dc
dg
  L
2
(c+ g) f 00 (k)
[[f (k)  k]  k [f 0 (k)  ]] d
dg
;
=
kL
c+ g
+
kL
c+ g
dc
dg
  L
2 ~f (k)
(c+ g) f 00 (k)
d
dg
:
Totally di¤erentiating (E1) yields:
dc
dg
=
1
u00 (c)
 0 (kL)
(+ )2
d
dg
+
00 (kL)
+ 

k
dL
dg
+ L
dk
dg

;
=
 0 (kL)
cu00 (c) (+ )
"
cu0 (c)
0 (kL)
d
dg
  
00 (kL)
0 (kL)
"
kLc
c+ g
+
kLc
c+ g
dc
dg
  L
2c ~f (k)
(c+ g) f 00 (k)
d
dg
##
;
=
"
"u
c
c+ g
+
1
"u
"
cu0 (c)
0 (kL)
  " L
~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
c
c+ g
#
d
dg
+
"
"u
c
c+ g
dc
dg
;
where I have used the fact that 0 (kL) = (+ ) = u0 (c). Hence:
dc
dg
=
c"
(c+ g) "u   c" +
c
(c+ g) "u   c"
"
(c+ g)u0 (c)
0 (kL)
  " L
~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
#
d
dg
:
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It follows that:
k
dL
dg
+ L
dk
dg
=
kL
c+ g
(c+ g) "u
(c+ g) "u   c"
+
kL
c+ g
1
(c+ g) "u   c"
"
c (c+ g)u0 (c)
0 (kL)
  c" L
~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
  ((c+ g) "u   c") L
~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
#
d
dg
;
=
kL"u
(c+ g) "u   c" +
kL
(c+ g) "u   c"
"
cu0 (c)
0 (kL)
  "u L
~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
#
d
dg
:
Di¤erentiating (E4) yields:
dl
dg
=
1
v00 (l)

 kf 00 (k)u0 (c) dk
dg
+ ~f (k)u00 (c)
dc
dg

;
=
c"
(c+ g) "u   c"
~f (k)u00 (c)
v00 (l)
+
1
v00 (l)
"
ku0 (c) +
c ~f (k)u00 (c)
(c+ g) "u   c"
"
(c+ g)u0 (c)
0 (kL)
  " L
~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
##
d
dg
;
By totally di¤erentiating (E3), we obtain:
~f (k)
d
dg
      R    kf 00 (k) dk
dg
=

l
~f 0

L
l
k

L
dk
dg
+ k
dL
dg
  kL
l
dl
dg

:
Substituting the above expressions into this equation gives:
~f (k)
d
dg
+

    R    kd
dg
=

l
~f 0

L
l
k
"
kL"u
(c+ g) "u   c"  
kL
l
c"
(c+ g) "u   c"
~f (k)u00 (c)
v00 (l)
#
+

l
~f 0

L
l
k

[:::]
d
dg
:
As  tends to zero,     R    also tends to zero. Thus, solving for d=dg shows that
it tends to:
1
~f (k)

l
~f 0

L
l
k

kL
(c+ g) "u   c"
"
"u   c"
~f (k)u00 (c)
lv00 (l)
#
.
This shows that d=dg tends to zero as  tends to zero. Moreover, if (c+ g) "u > c",
then, for  strictly positive but su¢ ciently small, we have d=dg > 0.
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Finally, the scal multiplier is obtained by di¤erentiating (E6):
dy
dg
= 1 +
dc
dg
+ 

k
dL
dg
+ L
dk
dg

;
= 1 +
kL"u + c"
(c+ g) "u   c" +
1
(c+ g) "u   c"
"
c (c+ g)u0 (c)
0 (kL)
  c" L
~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
+
ckLu0 (c)
0 (kL)
  "u L
2 ~f (k)
f 00 (k)
#
d
dg
;
= 1 +
kL+ c"="u
(c+ g)  c"="u
+
1
(c+ g) "u   c"
"
cu0 (c) f (k)
0 (kL)
  (kL"u + c") L
~f (k)
kf 00 (k)
#
d
dg
:
Thus, in the limit as  tends to zero, d=dg = 0 and the multiplier is equal to:
1 +
kL+ c "
"u
(c+ g)  c "
"u
:
When  is strictly positive, but su¢ ciently small, then d=dg > 0 and the multiplier is
even larger.
E.5 Proof of Proposition 5
In steady state, welfare is equal to:
W =
u (c)  v (L) + h ( m) +  (kL)

,
where I have used the fact that, in equilibrium, the wealth of households net of government
liabilities must be equal to the stock of physical capital. In the limit as  tends to zero,
ination is equal to R. Thus, by (E2) with  = R, we know that k is independent of
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the scal policy. We have:
dW
dg
=
1


u0 (c)
dc
dg
+ [k0 (kL)  v0 (L)] dL
dg

;
=
1


u0 (c)
c"
(c+ g) "u   c" + [k
0 (kL)  v0 (L)] L"u
(c+ g) "u   c"

;
=
1

1
(c+ g) "u   c"

cu0 (c) " +

kL
 
+ R

u0 (c)  Lv0 (L) "u ;
=
1

1
(c+ g) "u   c"

c
v0 (l)
~f (k)
" +

kL
 
+ R
  ~f (k)Lv0 (L)
v0 (l)

v0 (l)
~f (k)
"u

;
=
1

"u
(c+ g) "u   c"
v0 (l)
~f (k)

c
"
"u
+ kL
 
+ R
  Lf (k)  kL     R v0 (L)
v0 (l)

;
=
1

"u
(c+ g) "u   c"
v0 (l)
~f (k)

c
"
"u
+ kL

+ R

1  v
0 (L)
v0 (l)

  [c+ g] v
0 (L)
v0 (l)

;
where, to get the second line, I have used results from the proof of Proposition 4 with
d=dg = 0. If (c+ g) "u > c", then, in the limit as  tends to zero, an increase in g is
welfare enhancing if and only if the term in the main square bracket is positive.
F Proof of Proposition 8
The steady state equilibrium (c;K; ; l; L) under the optimal policy with ination target
^ 2 R;  is fully characterized by:
u0 (c) =
0 (K)
+    rn   ^ ; 
1  sI [^   ] =  1  K [FK (K;L)     rn] ;
v0 (l) = FL (K;L)u0 (c) ;
F (K;L) = c+ K;
FL (K;L) =
(
FL (K; l)

 (R )FL (K; l)
if  2 R;+1
if  2  R   ; R ;
where I have substituted the optimal wealth tax (78) into the demand for consumption
(61) to obtain the rst line and I have substituted the optimal corporate income tax
policy (79) into the demand for investment resulting from (57) and (65) to obtain the
second line.51
When  = ^ 2 R; , the above equations that characterize the steady state
51I have used the fact that, in steady state, the nominal interest rate must be equal to zero. This
must be the case in the secular stagnation steady state as  = ^  R (cf. footnote 14). The frictionless
steady state is such that r =  ^, which implies that i = r +  =  ^ +  = 0.
59
equilibrium of the decentralized economy coincide with those that characterize the rst-
best allocation. Hence, there is a steady state equilibrium with  = ^ that implements the
rst-best allocation (as we already know from Proposition 7). However, proceeding as in
the proof of Lemma 3, it can be shown that a secular stagnation steady state equilibrium
with  2  R   ; R also exists provided that c > 0 when  = R   , i.e. provided
that +
 
R     rn  ^ > 0 or equivalently  < +R+   ^, where I have used the
fact that rn =  .52 Clearly, if ^ > R, then the secular stagnation equilibrium cannot
coincide with the frictionless equilibrium.
Let us now prove that, conversely, the two equilibria can coincide when ^ = R.
The frictionless and secular stagnation equilibria are characterized by the same set of
equations, except for one exception: the frictionless equilibrium satises L = l, while the
secular stagnation equilibrium satises

    R   FL (K;L) = FL (K; l). Clearly,
when ^ = R, the frictionless equilibrium with  = ^ = R satises all the equations that
characterize the secular stagnation equilibrium, including

    R   FL (K;L) =
FL (K; l).53 Hence, when ^ = R, there is a secular stagnation equilibrium that coincides
with the frictionless equilibrium. If the secular stagnation equilibrium is unique, then it
must coincide with the frictionless equilibrium.
Proceeding as in the proof of Lemma 3, it can be shown that, if  is su¢ ciently small,
the secular stagnation steady state equilibrium is unique.54
52As  >   ^, the optimal policy increases the range of values of  for which a secular stagnation
equilibrium exists.
53The secular stagnation equilibrium has so far been dened for  2  R   ; R, rather than  2 
R   ; R, since it typically satises L < l, which requires  < R. However, it must fundamentally
be characterized by the rst four equations of this proof together with

    R   FL (K;L) =
FL (K; l). When the optimal policy with ^ = R is implemented, it turns out that the secular stagnation
equilibrium is consistent with L = l and, hence, with  = R.
54Alternatively, uniqueness can be shown by proving that, for  su¢ ciently small, any secular stagna-
tion steady state must satisfy dys=d > dyd=d, where ys = F (K;L) and yd = c+ K.
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